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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2006, the State of Nebraska adopted legislation that authorizes
the civil commitment of convicted sex offenders who are "substantially
unable to control [their] criminal behavior" and who "suffer[] from a
mental illness .. .or . . .a personality disorder which makes [them]
576 [Vol. 85:575
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likely to engage in repeat acts of sexual violence."' This legislation,
which has its origins in the "sexually violent predator" commitment
statutes of Washington 2 and Kansas, 3 authorizes the continuous, in-
definite confinement of sex offenders who have completed their prison
terms and who do not meet the state's traditional "mentally ill and
dangerous civil commitment standard."4 Courts reviewing the consti-
tutionality of the Washington and Kansas statutes struggled to cate-
gorize these unique commitments as "civil" or "criminal" dispositions
and could not agree whether the commitments were predicated upon
psychological impairments that justify civil deprivations of liberty.
The Supreme Court ultimately resolved these controversial questions
in favor of the validity of the Washington and Kansas commitment
procedures. 5
This Article attempts to explain the difficulty that inheres in clas-
sifying convicted sex offender commitments as civil or criminal dispo-
sitions and argues that the civil commitment of convicted sex
offenders can, under certain circumstances, distort the interrelation-
ship between criminal responsibility and psychological impairment
that underlies the basic institutions of criminal justice and civil com-
mitment in the United States. The Article is organized as follows:
Part II describes the origins, terms, and controversial features of the
Kansas and Washington sexual predator commitment statutes and
summarizes key legal challenges that have been raised against those
statutes. Part III describes the origins and terms of Nebraska's new
sex offender commitment act and compares its terms to those of the
Washington and Kansas statutes. It should be noted that this Article
does not attempt to argue whether the cases addressing the controver-
sial aspects of the Washington and Kansas statutes will apply with
equal force to the Nebraska act; rather, it argues only that the Ne-
braska act, like the Washington and Kansas statutes, raises concerns
about the proper functions of criminal punishment and civil commit-
ment. Part IV briefly recounts the test employed by the Supreme
Court to distinguish civil deprivations of liberty from criminal depri-
vations of liberty and outlines an alternate analytical framework that
is consistent with the American institutions of civil commitment and
criminal punishment. This framework, which is based upon the ex-
pressive function performed by criminal punishment, is then applied
to convicted sex offender commitments, and the manner in which the
1. L.B. 1199, 99th Leg., 2d Sess. § 87(1), 86-91 (Neb. 2006).
2. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.09.010-.902 (West 2002 & West Supp. 2005).
3. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to -29a21 (2005).
4. JUDICIARY COMM., COMMITTEE STATEMENT: L.B. 1199, 99th Leg., 2d Sess., at 3
(Neb. 2006), available at http://srvwww.unicam.state.ne.us/unicamAllDraft-
ing.html (search "Search Drafting for" for "LB 1199" in the "99th - Committee
Statements" index; then follow link for "Microsoft Word - CS LB1199.doc").
5. See infra Part II.
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most controversial of these commitments distort the distinction be-
tween criminal and civil sanctions is illustrated. Part V concludes the
Article.
II. SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR COMMITMENTS
Historically, states have struggled to determine the appropriate le-
gal institution for dealing with sex offenders.6 A metaphorical pendu-
lum swung from a preference for criminal punishment to one for civil
commitment, and back again to punishment, 7 until the pendulum
was, in a sense, thrust in both directions simultaneously with the
adoption of the "sexually violent predator" commitment procedure in
the State of Washington.S The new procedure redefined the sort of
psychological impairment that would support a commitment and, in
some cases, eliminated the standard commitment statute's require-
ment that an individual's dangerousness be proved by evidence of a
recent overt act.9 Courts were soon called upon to evaluate the consti-
tutionality of this new procedure, as well as a similar procedure that
was adopted in Kansas.lo Two main areas of concern emerged. First,
courts had difficulty determining whether sexually violent predator
commitments were actually civil or criminal in nature. Second, the
courts struggled to determine whether the statutes' commitment crite-
rion of "mental abnormality or personality disorder" satisfied the sub-
stantive due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Courts reached different conclusions on each of these issues; indeed,
the Supreme Court was required to analyze each issue twice in order
to address adequately the lower courts' concerns about the civil or
criminal status of the commitments and the substantive nature of psy-
chological impairments that could justify a civil deprivation of liberty.
This Part presents a brief overview of the legal treatment of sex
offenders during the past century before proceeding to describe the
circumstances that led to the adoption of the sexually violent predator
commitment statutes in Washington and Kansas, the terms of the
statutes, and courts' analyses of their constitutionality.
A. A Brief Overview of the History of the Legal Treatment
of Sex Offenders
Over the course of the last century in the United States, sex offend-
ers have been alternately punished as criminals and committed as
6. See infra section II.A.
7. See generally Samuel Jan Brakel & James L. Cavanaugh, Jr., Of Psychopaths
and Pendulums: Legal and Psychiatric Treatment of Sex Offenders in the United
States, 30 N.M. L. REV. 69, 70 (2000).
8. See infra section II.B.
9. See infra section II.B.
10. See infra sections I.B-C.
[Vol. 85:575
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"psychopaths."11 Before the 1930s, the criminal law generally treated
sex offenders no differently than it treated other criminals, and "[t]he
assignation of blame and punishment, typically via criminal convic-
tion and incarceration, was the chief goal" of the legal response.12
Early in the twentieth century, however, "a new rehabilitation-fo-
cused era" began.13 "Treatment goals" and "indeterminate confine-
ments," as opposed to punishment and offense-specific sentencing,
were emphasized. 14 State legislatures, beginning with Michigan's in
1937, began to adopt involuntary civil commitment procedures specifi-
cally directed toward sex offenders.15 Although the particular terms
of the commitment statutes varied from state to state, 16 the goal of
these statutes, on the whole, was to divert sex offenders from the crim-
inal justice system so that they could be civilly committed instead.17
These statutes reflected "the general optimism [of the era] about the
ability to identify and treat" certain sex offenders.18 However, this
optimism began to fade in the wake of "practical experience and ad-
vancing scientific theory," as it became apparent that "sexual psycho-
paths" could not be reliably identified or effectively treated.19 At the
same time, public opinion turned against the rehabilitative model of
criminal justice, and a shift toward a more punitive philosophy oc-
curred. 20 As a result, the number of states with these special sex of-
fender commitment statutes was halved between 1960 and 1990,21
and those that remained "on the books" were rarely invoked. 2 2 Thus,
U.S. jurisprudence regarding sex offenders was close to where it was before
the whole sexual psychopath law experiment began: back to undifferentiated,
criminal treatment, rejection of special rehabilitative goals or methods for sex
offenders, and incarceration of sex offenders in prisons, sometimes under ha-
bitual criminal statutes permitting extra-long sentences. 2 3
In 1990, however, a legal innovation in the State of Washington gave
rise to a new mechanism for incapacitating sex offenders: the sexually
violent predator commitment procedure.
11. See generally Brakel & Cavanaugh, supra note 7.
12. Id. at 70.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. John Matthew Fabian, The Risky Business of Conducting Risk Assessments for
Those Already Civilly Committed as Sexually Violent Predators, 32 WM. MITCH-
ELL L. REV. 81, 88 (2005).
16. See, e.g., Brakel & Cavanaugh, supra note 7, at 72 (noting that "pre-conviction"
and "post-conviction" models were adopted in various states).
17. Travis D. Weitzel, The Constitutionality of Quasi-Convictions, 36 RUTGERS L.J.
1029, 1041 (2005).
18. Brakel & Cavanaugh, supra note 7, at 71-72.
19. Id. at 73.
20. Id.
21. See Fabian, supra note 15, at 89.
22. Brakel & Cavanaugh, supra note 7, at 74.
23. Id.
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B. The Washington Sexually Violent Predator Commitment
Procedure
On May 20, 1989, Earl Shriner raped, choked, and mutilated a
seven-year-old boy from South Tacoma, Washington, and left him for
dead.24 Shriner, whose IQ was reportedly "equal or inferior to [that
ofl a child between 8 and 12 years old,"25 had a criminal history dating
to 1965.26 In 1977, Shriner pleaded guilty to charges stemming from
assaults upon two sixteen-year-old hitchhikers, and he was sentenced
to ten years' imprisonment.2 7 Just prior to his release, "diaries and
drawings ... in which he described his intent to rape, torture and kill
children using cages, shackles, ammonia, razor blades and a farm tool
intended for castrating bulls" were found in his cell. 28 An attempt to
have Shriner civilly committed failed; thus, despite the indications of
his intent to reoffend, he was freed when he completed his prison
term.2 9 It did not take him long to reoffend after his release; indeed,
Shriner was convicted in two separate cases before the brutal assault
of May 20, 1989.30
24. Kate Shatzkin, Shriner Guilty: Jury Convicts Him in Attack on Boy, SEATTLE
TIMES, Feb. 7, 1990, at Al. The boy's life was saved when he was found wander-
ing, naked and with a noose wrapped around his neck, in a wooded area near his
home. Id.; System Fails to Halt Sex Offender, TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 24, 1989, at
A6. A detailed description of the crime and the media and public's response to it
may be found in David Boerner, Confronting Violence: In the Act and in the Word,
15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 525, 525-38 (1992).
25. Editorial, Shriner's Threat is Finally Shackled, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,
Mar. 28, 1990, at A6.
26. See, e.g., System Fails to Halt Sex Offender, supra note 24. According to media
reports, Shriner "was declared a 'defective delinquent' after choking a 7-year-old
girl" in 1965. Id. Shortly thereafter, he killed a fifteen-year-old girl. Id. Since
Shriner's youth prevented the state from filing homicide charges against him, he
was sent to a reform school. Id.; Shatzkin, supra note 24. After officials at the
reform school decided that Shriner was "too dangerous," he was committed to
Western State Hospital from 1968 to 1973. System Fails to Halt Sex Offender,
supra note 24.
27. System Fails to Halt Sex Offender, supra note 24. It was reported that Shriner
was ordered to be "committed to the sexual psychopath program at Eastern State
Hospital, but officials there refused to accept him." Id. As a result, he served his
term of incarceration at the Shelton Correctional Center. Id.
28. David Foster, Many Favor Tougher Policy on Sex Offenders: Mutilation Case Fu-
els Outrage, Questions About Rehabilitation, AKRON BEACON J., Feb. 18, 1990, at
All.
29. Id.; Boerner, supra note 24, at 542-43 ("[Tlhe civil commitment system was not
designed for cases such as Earl Shriner's and ... the dismissal [of the civil com-
mitment proceeding against Shriner] was an accurate application of the intent of
the legislature.").
30. Foster, supra note 28 ("In August 1987, Shriner stabbed a boy in Tacoma; he
served 66 days for attempted assault. In January 1988, he tied a 10-year-old boy
to a fence post and beat him. Prosecutors dropped a charge of attempted rape,
Shriner pleaded guilty to attempted unlawful imprisonment and, after barely two
months in prison, he was freed that December.")
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Shriner's attack upon the South Tacoma boy, which alone was suf-
ficient to "provoke[] outrage throughout the state,"3 1 was followed
closely in time by a series of offenses against other children living in
the area. 3 2 In response to the public's demand for action, Washington
Governor Booth Gardner established the Governor's Task Force on
Community Protection. 33 As stated by its chairman,34 the task force's
mission was "to respond in a meaningful and responsible way to the
public outrage over . . .cases in which violent sex offenders were re-
leased to the community only to reoffend."35 The task force submitted
a set of recommendations to the legislature,36 and many of these rec-
ommendations were incorporated into the Community Protection Act
of 1990.37 The Act, which passed without a dissenting vote,38 in-
creased the length of sentences for sex offenses 39 and implemented
the nation's first modern community notification law targeting sex
offenders.40
The Act also established a new civil commitment procedure for cer-
tain sex offenders.41 Specifically, the procedure was designed to facili-
31. Shatzkin, supra note 24.
32. Daniel M. Filler, Silence and the Racial Dimension of Megan's Law, 89 IOWA L.
REV. 1535, 1542 (2004) ("In September 1989, two brothers, William and Cole
Neer-ages ten and eleven-were murdered in suburban Vancouver, Washing-
ton. A few weeks later, four-year-old Lee Joseph Islei was abducted from a
schoolyard, raped and killed. Two weeks after that, Westley Dodd was arrested
after abducting a six-year-old boy from a movie theater restroom. Dodd was sub-
sequently charged with both the Neer and the Islei murders." (footnotes omit-
ted)). Shriner's offense was also preceded by the abduction, rape, and murder of
Diane Ballasiotes in Seattle. J. Christopher Rideout, So What's in a Name? A
Rhetorical Reading of Washington's Sexually Violent Predators Act, 15 U. PUGET
SOUND L. REV. 781, 784 (1992) (citing Dave Birkland, Jailed Man a Suspect in
Slaying, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 4, 1988, at B1).
33. See Rideout, supra note 32, at 786-87; see also id. at 787 n.24 (citing Exec. Order
No. 89-04, Wash. Reg. 89-13-055 (1989)). Members of the task force included the
mothers of Dianne Ballasiotes and Earl Shriner's last victim, id. at 787 n.24, who
had become vocal advocates for legal reforms, see Kate Shatzkin, Shriner Case
Skirts More Deadly Turf Home, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 21, 1990, at H1; Filler,
supra note 32, at 1542-43.
34. Boerner, supra note 24, at 538 & n.3.
35. Norm Maleng, The Community Protection Act and the Sexually Violent Predators
Statute, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 821, 821 (1992).
36. Id. at 822.
37. See id.; Community Protection Act, ch. 3, 1990 Wash. Sess. Laws 13.
38. Maleng, supra note 35, at 822.
39. Foster, supra note 28; see also Community Protection Act, ch. 3, §§ 701-708,
901-904, 1990 Wash. Sess. Laws 13, 70-91, 96-97 (outlining sentences for sex
offenses and provisions for enhancing those sentences).
40. Filler, supra note 32, at 1543; see also Community Protection Act, ch. 3,
§§ 101-131, 401-409, 1990 Wash. Sess. Laws 13, 13-16, 49-53 (containing the
community notification and sex offender registration provisions).
41. Boerner, supra note 24, at 540; see also Foster, supra note 28 (civil commitment
procedure would allow state to "hold incorrigible offenders indefinitely"); Commu-
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tate the involuntary commitment of persons who belong to "a small
but extremely dangerous group of sexually violent predators" who are
not amenable to commitment under the state's standard procedure. 4 2
"Sexually violent predators" are defined as persons who have been
"convicted of or charged with a crime of sexual violence and who suf-
fer[ I from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes
[them] likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence if not con-
fined in a secure facility."4 3 According to Washington's legislature,
these persons are not eligible for commitment under the standard civil
commitment procedure for two reasons. First, the legislature con-
cluded that the mental abnormalities or personality disorders af-
flicting sexually violent predators do not amount to "mental disease [s]
or defect[s] that render[] [the predators] appropriate for the existing
involuntary treatment act."44 Second, the legislature noted that sexu-
ally violent predators serving prison terms "do not have access to po-
tential victims," which frustrates the state's ability to prove that these
predators have committed "recent overt acts"-a prerequisite to com-
mitment under the standard civil commitment statute.45 In short, the
sexually violent predator commitment procedure was meant to close
perceived loopholes in the state's standard involuntary civil commit-
ment procedure-loopholes that allowed people such as Earl Shriner
nity Protection Act, ch. 3, §§ 1001-1013, 1990 Wash. Sess. Laws 13, 97-102 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections ofWASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09).
42. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010 (West 2002) (emphasis added). The standard
commitment procedure appears at WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.05.10-.940 (West
2002 & West Supp. 2005).
43. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(16) (West Supp. 2005). "'Mental abnormality'
means a congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional ca-
pacity which predisposes the person to the commission of criminal sexual acts in
a degree constituting such person a menace to the health and safety of others."
Id. § 71.09.020(8). The term "personality disorder" is not defined specifically in
the statute; however, the Washington Supreme Court interpreted the term in a
manner consistent with its use in the American Psychiatric Association's Diag-
nostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. See In re Young, 857 P.2d
989, 1002-03 (Wash. 1993), superseded by statute, WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 71.09.020 (West Supp. 2005).
44. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010 (West 2002). See also id. ("The legislature
further finds that the prognosis for curing sexually violent predators is poor, the
treatment needs of this population are very long term, and the treatment modali-
ties for this population are very different than the traditional treatment modali-
ties for people appropriate for commitment under the involuntary treatment
act.").
45. Id. See also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.020(19) (West 2002) (current version
at WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.020(21) (2006)) (defining "[1]ikelihood of serious
harm" under the involuntary treatment act); In re Harris, 654 P.2d 109, 113
(Wash. 1982) ("We ... interpret RCW 71.05.020 as requiring a showing of a sub-
stantial risk of physical harm as evidenced by a recent overt act."). But see In re
Pugh, 845 P.2d 1034, 1038-39 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that overt act re-
quirement was satisfied despite Pugh's confinement).
[Vol. 85:575
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to avoid commitment-by redefining the sort of psychological impair-
ment that would support a commitment and eliminating the "recent
overt act" requirement.
In Washington, the procedure for committing a sexually violent
predator begins with the filing of"a petition alleging that the person is
a 'sexually violent predator' and stating sufficient facts to support
such allegation."46 This petition may be filed whenever it appears
that a person may be a "sexually violent predator," as that term is
defined above, 47 and any of the following circumstances exist: (1) the
person was previously convicted of a "sexually violent offense"48 and is
due to be released from confinement; (2) the person committed a "sex-
ually violent offense" as a juvenile and is due to be released from con-
finement; (3) the person was charged with a "sexually violent offense,"
but was found to be incompetent to stand trial; (4) the person was
found not guilty of a "sexually violent offense" by reason of insanity; or
(5) the person was convicted of a "sexually violent offense," has been
released, and has committed a "recent overt act."49 After the petition
is filed, a judge must determine whether there is probable cause to
believe that the person is, in fact, a sexually violent predator.5O If the
judge finds that probable cause exists, the person is taken into custody
until a probable cause hearing may be held.51 If, at the conclusion of
this hearing, the court finds that there is probable cause to believe
that the person is a sexually violent predator, the person must be
transferred to "an appropriate facility for an evaluation as to whether
the person is a sexually violent predator."5 2 The court must then hold
a trial to determine whether, beyond a reasonable doubt,53 the person
is a sexually violent predator.54 The person, the government, or the
46. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.030 (West 2002). The petition may be filed by
"the prosecuting attorney of the county where the person was convicted or
charged [with a 'sexually violent offense,'] or the attorney general if requested by
the prosecuting attorney." Id.
47. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
48. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(15) (West Supp. 2005). "Sexually violent
offenses" are enumerated in the statute and include rapes and certain other of-
fenses that are found to be "sexually motivated" beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
49. See id. § 71.09.030. A "recent overt act" is defined as "any act or threat that has
either caused harm of a sexually violent nature or creates a reasonable apprehen-
sion of such harm in the mind of an objective person who knows of the history and
mental condition of the person engaging in the act." Id. § 71.09.020(10).
50. Id. § 71.09.040(1).
51. Id. § 71.09.040(1)-(2). The probable cause hearing must occur within seventy-
two hours after the person is taken into custody. Id. § 71.09.040(2).
52. Id. § 71.09.040(4).
53. Id. § 71.09.060(1).
54. Id. § 71.09.050(1). The trial must be held within forty-five days of the completion
of the probable cause hearing, absent continuances which may be granted upon a
showing of good cause or upon the court's own motion. Id.
2007]
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court may demand that the trial be held before a twelve-person jury,55
and if the determination is made by a jury, its verdict must be unani-
mous. 56 At the conclusion of the trial, if the court or jury determines
that the person is a sexually violent predator, the person is "commit-
ted to the custody of the department of social and health services for
placement in a secure facility ... for control, care, and treatment."57
The person must then remain in custody until his or her condition
"has so changed that the person no longer meets the definition of a
sexually violent predator," or until it is appropriate to release the per-
son conditionally "to a less restrictive alternative."58
Washington's sexually violent predator commitment procedure
was soon challenged by two men, Andre Brigham Young and Vance
Russell Cunningham, who were "civilly committed under its author-
ity" after serving prison terms for rape. 5 9 Their challenge provided
the Washington Supreme Court with its first opportunity to deter-
mine the legality of the new procedure, and a number of their key
arguments were ultimately presented to the federal courts as well.
The state and federal courts' disposition of their arguments will be
summarized below.
1. In re Young: The Washington Supreme Court Considers the
Constitutionality of Sexually Violent Predator
Commitments
In support of their challenge to the Washington sexually violent
predator commitment procedure, the defendants 6O submitted two
55. Id. § 71.09.050(3).
56. Id. § 71.09.060(1). It should be noted that the person will not be released from
confinement unless the jury decides unanimously that he or she is not a sexually
violent predator. See id. "If the jury is unable to reach a unanimous verdict, the
court shall declare a mistrial and set a retrial within forty-five days of the date of
the mistrial unless the prosecuting agency.., moves to dismiss the petition." Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. Persons who have been committed are reviewed on at least an annual basis to
determine whether they "currently meet[] the definition of a sexually violent
predator and whether conditional release to a less restrictive alternative is in the
best interest of the person and conditions can be imposed that would adequately
protect the community." Id. § 71.09.070. See also id. §§ 71.09.090-.098 (outlin-
ing the procedure for conditional release to less restrictive alternative).
59. See In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 992, 994-96 (Wash. 1993), superseded by statute,
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020 (West Supp. 2005). A petition alleging that
Young was a sexual predator was filed one day prior to his release from prison,
and a similar petition was filed against Cunningham approximately four and
one-half months after he completed a prison term. Id. at 994-95.
60. It is imprecise to refer to Young and Cunningham as "defendants" because their
direct appeals from their commitments were consolidated with personal restraint
petitions (filed by Young and Cunningham) and resolved in a single opinion. See
id. at 996. Nevertheless, in the interests of clarity and consistency this Article
adopts the convention of referring to persons who were convicted of sex offenses
[Vol. 85:575
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main arguments to the Washington Supreme Court: First, they ar-
gued that the commitment procedure violated both the Ex Post
Facto6 l and Double Jeopardy Clauses,62 and was therefore unconsti-
tutional.6 3 Second, they argued that their commitments did not com-
port with constitutional principles of "substantive due process."64 The
Washington Supreme Court's analysis of each argument will be dis-
cussed in turn.6 5
and alleged to be "sexually violent predators" as "defendants." Though this con-
vention results in a sacrifice of precision, it eliminates the distraction that some-
times accompanies the imposition of labels which vary based solely upon the
procedural posture of a particular case.
61. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 10; see also In re Young, 857 P.2d at 999 ("A law violates
the ex post facto prohibition if it aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it
was when committed; permits imposition of a different or more severe punish-
ment than was permissible when the crime was committed; or, changes the legal
rules to permit less or different testimony to convict the offender than was re-
quired when the crime was committed." (quoting State v. Edwards, 701 P.2d 508,
512 (Wash. 1985))).
62. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. "The double jeopardy clause prohibits multiple pun-
ishment for the same offense." In re Young, 857 P.2d at 999 (citing United States
v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989)).
63. In re Young, 857 P.2d at 996.
64. Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 748 (W.D. Wash. 1995) ("The Due Process
Clause protects individuals on both procedural and substantive levels. Substan-
tive due process 'prevents the government from engaging in conduct that "shocks
the conscience," or interferes with rights "implicit in the concept of ordered lib-
erty."' This substantive component of the Due Process Clause 'bars certain arbi-
trary, wrongful government actions "regardless of the fairness of the procedures
used to implement them."'" (citations omitted)); see also In re Young, 857 P.2d at
1000 (describing the defendants' substantive due process arguments).
65. The defendants also argued that the commitment procedure suffered from the
following five procedural infirmities: (1) "the ex parte finding of probable cause
denies meaningful predeprivation due process"; (2) "consideration of less restric-
tive alternatives to confinement is necessary"; (3) "the burden of proof at trial is
inadequate because the jury need not be unanimous"; (4) "the Statute is void for
vagueness"; and (5) "petitioners were unconstitutionally denied a right to remain
silent." In re Young, 857 P.2d at 1009. In addition, the defendants raised a num-
ber of evidentiary issues. See id. at 1015-18. A detailed review of these argu-
ments and the court's resolution of them is not necessary for the purposes of this
Article. Ultimately, Young's predator determination was affirmed, but his case
was remanded "solely for a consideration of less restrictive alternatives." Id. at
1018. This holding prompted the legislature to amend the statute to provide for
limited consideration of less restrictive alternatives to commitment in a secure
facility, which in turn spawned additional equal protection challenges from com-
mitted predators. See In re Thorell, 72 P.3d 708, 720-21 (Wash. 2003). Cunning-
ham's commitment was reversed for reasons that will be explained below.
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a. Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Challenges: The
Washington Supreme Court Determines that the
Sexually Violent Predator Commitment Statute
is "Civil" in Nature
Young and Cunningham claimed that their commitments as sexu-
ally violent predators violated the Constitution's Ex Post Facto and
Double Jeopardy Clauses. 66 Since the ex post facto and double jeop-
ardy prohibitions generally apply only to criminal matters, 6 7 the Su-
preme Court of Washington observed that the defendants' arguments
must be rejected if the sexual predator commitment procedure is civil
in nature.68 Therefore, the court applied the two-part analysis set
forth in United States v. Ward6 9 to determine whether the procedure
is truly civil or criminal.
The first step of the Ward analysis requires a court to consider
whether the language of the statute and its legislative history indicate
a preference for a "civil" or "criminal" label. 70 In In re Young, the
Washington Supreme Court readily concluded that "the Legislature
intended a civil statutory scheme" when it created the sexually violent
predator commitment statute.7 1 Specifically, the court noted that
"[t]he section of the law as enacted by the Legislature is entitled 'Civil
Commitment"'; that the statute compared itself to the "civil involun-
tary commitment act"; that the statute gave "no role in caring for com-
mitted sex predators" to the Department of Corrections; and that the
legislature's final report and the task force's report refer to the com-
mitment procedure as a civil law. 7 2
The court then proceeded to the second step of the Ward analysis,
which required it to consider whether "'the statutory scheme [is] so
punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State's] intention'
that the proceeding be civil." 73 To resolve this inquiry, the court ap-
plied the "guidance for the determination of whether a statute is crim-
inal" outlined by the Supreme Court in Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez;74 that is, the court considered
66. In re Young, 857 P.2d at 996.
67. See id. at 999 ("The ex post facto clause has been interpreted to apply only to
criminal matters." (citing, inter alia, Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798)));
id. ("Double jeopardy does not apply 'unless the sanction sought to be imposed in
the second proceeding is punitive in nature so that the proceeding is essentially
criminal.'" (quoting O'Day v. King County, 749 P.2d 142, 153 (Wash. 1988))).
68. See id. at 996.
69. 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980).
70. In re Young, 857 P.2d at 996.
71. Id. at 997.
72. Id. at 996-97.
73. Id. at 997 (quoting Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 369 (1986)).
74. 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963).
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[w]hether the [commitment procedure] involves an affirmative disability or
restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether
it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will pro-
mote the traditional aims of punishment (retribution and deterrence),
whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an alter-
native purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and
whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose
assigned.7 5
The court found that "[these factors weigh heavily on the side of find-
ing that [the sexual predator commitment] Statute is civil," stating,
Although the scheme here does involve an affirmative restraint, the civil com-
mitment goals of incapacitation and treatment are distinct from punishment,
and have been so regarded historically. Moreover, no finding of scienter is
required to commit an individual who is a sexually violent predator; the de-
termination is made based on a mental abnormality or personality disorder
rather than on one's culpability. Furthermore, the Statute is necessary to
serve the legitimate and vital purpose of protecting innocent potential
victims.7 6
After reemphasizing that the statute promoted the civil purposes
of incapacitation and treatment, as opposed to the punitive goals of
retribution and deterrence, the court concluded that the statute was
indeed "civil" in nature. 77 Given this conclusion, the court held that
the defendants' ex post facto and double jeopardy challenges necessa-
rily failed.78
b. The Washington Supreme Court Concludes that Sexually
Violent Predator Commitments Comport with
Principles of Substantive Due Process
The defendants also raised four "substantive due process"79 chal-
lenges against the sexually violent predator commitment procedure.SO
The court's analysis of each of these challenges is summarized below.
First, citing Addington v. TexasSl and Foucha v. Louisiana,8 2
Young and Cunningham claimed that the commitment procedure "al-
lows the State to hold individuals without proving that [they are] both
mentally ill and dangerous" in violation of those two cases.8 3 The
Washington Supreme Court rejected the argument that the statute
permits commitments without a showing of "mental illness," noting
that the terms "mental abnormality or personality disorder" set forth
in the statute "incorporate[] a number of recognized mental patholo-
75. In re Young, 857 P.2d at 997-98 (quoting Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168-69).
76. Id. at 998.
77. Id. at 998-99.
78. Id. at 999-1000.
79. See supra note 64.
80. In re Young, 857 P.2d at 1000.
81. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
82. 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
83. In re Young, 857 P.2d at 1001.
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gies" that are "nearly identical to the notion of 'mental disorder' as
defined in the [American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM)]."84 However, the court
also suggested that as long as "psychiatric and psychological clinicians
who testify in good faith as to mental abnormality are able to identify
sexual pathologies that are as real and meaningful as other patholo-
gies already listed in the DSM," a commitment may be based upon a
"mental pathology" that does not amount to a recognized "mental dis-
order."8 5 In that vein, the court observed that in each of the defend-
ants' specific cases, the state's experts diagnosed "paraphilia not
otherwise specified," a broad "residual category in the DSM-III-R
which encompasses both less commonly encountered paraphilias and
those not yet sufficiently described to merit formal inclusion in the
DSM-III-R."86 The court then concluded that the defendants' past sex
offenses provided a basis for their residual diagnoses:
The expert testimony further reflected that both [defendants] Young and
Cunningham could be classified within the "paraphilia not otherwise speci-
fied" category as suffering from "rape as paraphilia". [sic] According to the
seminal article on this mental disorder, portions of which were read into testi-
mony at both trials, certain patterns of rape fall into this diagnosis:
"Clinical interviews of rapists ... provide support for the classification of
rape as a paraphilia, because many individuals report having recurrent, re-
petitive, and compulsive urges and fantasies to commit rapes. These offend-
ers attempt to control their urges, but the urges eventually become so strong
that they act upon them, commit rapes, and then feel guilty afterwards with a
temporary reduction of urges, only to have the cycle repeat again. This cycle
• .. is similar to the clinical picture presented by exhibitionists, voyeurs,
pedophiles, and other traditionally recognized categories of paraphiliacs." 8 7
The court also noted that there was evidence that Young "suffered
from an 'anti-social personality disorder,"' which "is classified as a
mental disorder in the DSM-III-R."88 Thus, since the evidence sup-
ported findings that each defendant suffered from classifiable mental
disorders, the court rejected the defendants' claim that they were com-
mitted in the absence of proof that they suffered from "mental ill-
ness."8 9 The court also rejected the defendants' argument that the
sexual predator statute permits commitments without proof "that [a]
person is dangerous to the community," because "the statute requires
84. Id.
85. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Alexander D. Brooks, The Constitutionality and
Morality of Civilly Committing Violent Sexual Predators, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L.
REV. 709, 733 (1992)).
86. Id. at 1002.
87. Id. (quoting Gene G. Abel & Joanne-L. Rouleau, The Nature and Extent of Sexual
Assault, in HANDBOOK OF SEXUAL ASSAULT: ISSUES, THEORIES, AND TREATMENT OF
THE OFFENDER 9, 18 (W.L. Marshall et al. eds., 1990)).
88. Id. "Anti-social personality disorder is characterized by a long-term pattern of
irresponsible and anti-social behavior." Id. at 1003.
89. Id. at 1004.
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proof beyond a reasonable doubt that [a] person . . . suffers from a
mental abnormality or personality disorder 'which makes the person
likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence."'90
The defendants' second substantive due process argument was
based on a claim that "the nature and duration of commitment [do
not] bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the indi-
vidual is committed." 9 1 The court rejected this argument readily, not-
ing that the statute serves the purposes of "treatment and
incapacitation" and that the defendants' dangerousness "justifies
[their assignment to] a secure confinement facility."9 2
Third, and relatedly, the defendants asserted that the commitment
procedure amounted to "unconstitutional preventive detention."9 3
However, the court concluded that since the procedure "is narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest"; since no commitments
can occur absent proof "that the individual is mentally ill and danger-
ous"; and since the state bears the burden to prove, beyond a reasona-
ble doubt, that the person is suffering from a mental disorder and is
dangerous, the procedure is constitutional.94 The court also noted
that "the Statute's release provisions provide the opportunity for peri-
odic review of the committed individual's current mental condition
and continuing dangerousness to the community."95
Finally, the defendants argued that the sexual predator commit-
ment procedure violated Washington's constitutional requirement of
"evidence of a recent overt act to prove dangerousness." 96 The court
concluded that, "where an individual has been released from confine-
ment on a sex offense . . . and lives in the community immediately
prior to the initiation of sex predator proceedings," "proof of a recent
overt act is necessary to satisfy due process concerns."9 7 However,
the court found that if a sexually violent predator has been incarcer-
ated prior to commitment, "a requirement of a recent overt act under
the Statute would create a standard which would be impossible to
meet."98 Reasoning that "due process does not require that the absurd
be done before a compelling state interest can be vindicated,"9 9 and
recognizing that "the Legislature expressly noted that the [standard]
involuntary commitment statute was an inadequate remedy because
90. Id. at 1003-04 & n.9 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(1) (West 1992)
(current version at WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(16) (West Supp. 2005))).
91. Id. at 1004 (quoting Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983)).
92. Id. at 1004-05.
93. Id. at 1005 (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992)).
94. Id. at 1005-08 (footnote omitted).
95. Id. at 1008.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1009 (citation omitted).
98. Id. at 1008.
99. Id. at 1008 (quoting People v. Martin, 165 Cal. Rptr. 773, 780 (Ct. App. 1980)).
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confinement prevented any overt act,"10 0 the court held that when in-
dividuals are incarcerated when sexual predator commitment pro-
ceedings are initiated, "no evidence of a recent overt act is
required."1o1 Since Cunningham had been released from prison and
had lived in the community for approximately four and one-half
months before the sexual predator petition was filed against him, and
since there was no evidence or allegation that Cunningham committed
a recent overt act, the court reversed his commitment.' 0 2 Young, how-
ever, was incarcerated at the time of the filing of the petition;O 3
therefore, his commitment remained valid despite the absence of evi-
dence of a recent overt act.' 0 4
2. Young v. Weston: The United States District Court for the
Western District of Washington Rejects the
Washington Supreme Court's Analysis of the
Constitutionality of the Sexually
Violent Predator Commitment Procedure
After failing to obtain relief from the Washington Supreme Court,
Young filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Washington.1o5 The court's
analysis of the petition focused on three of the arguments that Young
presented to the Washington Supreme Court; specifically, the court
considered whether the sexual predator commitment statute violated
the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Double Jeopardy Clause, and the Four-
teenth Amendment's substantive due process component. 0 6
a. Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Challenges: The
District Court Determines that the Sexually Violent
Predator Commitment Statute is "Criminal"
in Nature
The district court began its analysis of Young's ex post facto chal-
lenge by studying the sexually violent predator commitment statute to
determine whether it was truly civil or criminal in nature.10 7 In do-
ing so, the court considered the same factors that the Washington Su-
preme Court applied when it determined that the statute was civil in
100. Id. at 1009 (citation omitted).
101. Id.
102. Id. Cunningham's commitment was also reversed on the ground that the jury's
verdict was not unanimous. Id. at 1012.
103. The petition was filed one day before Young's release from prison following his
most recent rape conviction. Id. at 994.
104. Id. at 1018. Young's case was remanded "solely for a consideration of less restric-
tive alternatives." Id.
105. Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 745 (W.D. Wash. 1995).
106. Id. at 748.
107. Id. at 751-53.
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nature; 0 8 however, the district court reached the opposite result.109
First, the court noted that "there is no dispute that [the] Statute sub-
jects individuals to an affirmative restraint.""10 Second, it observed
that "the Statute applies to behavior that is already criminal,""' stat-
ing, "Indeed, [the statute] is expressly limited in its application to per-
sons who have been convicted of a crime or who have been charged
with a crime but found incompetent to stand trial or found not guilty
by reason of insanity."1 1 2 Third, and in stark contrast to the Washing-
ton Supreme Court,113 the court found that "the Statute, in its opera-
tion, will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution
and deterrence."' 1 4 In support of this finding, the court noted that the
statute "requires that the convicted sex offender serve his sentence
prior to commitment," "forecloses the possibility that offenders will be
evaluated and treated until after they have been punished," and
thereby delays treatment, which "strongly suggests that treatment is
of secondary, rather than primary, concern.""15 Because the court
found that the statute was truly criminal in nature, and because it
was applied to Young retrospectively and to his disadvantage, the
court held that Young's commitment violated the Ex Post Facto
Clause of the Constitution.11 6 In addition, the court held that since
the statute "serves the traditional aims of punishment-retribution
and deterrence," and since Young had already been punished for com-
mitting a sexually violent offense, his incarceration as a sexually vio-
lent predator amounted to a second punishment in violation of the
Double Jeopardy Clause.117
108. Compare Young, 898 F. Supp. at 751-53, with In re Young, 857 P.2d at 996-98.
To refresh, the district court cited the two-step procedure outlined in United
States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980), and considered the factors set forth in
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963). Young, 898 F. Supp.
at 751-52. Those factors are:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it
comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will
promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deter-
rence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime,
whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected
is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the
alternative purpose.
Id. at 752 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Kennedy, 372 U.S. at
168-69).
109. Id. at 752-53.
110. Id. at 752.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See In re Young, 857 P.2d at 998-99.
114. Young, 898 F. Supp. at 752.
115. Id. at 752-53.
116. Id. at 753.
117. Id. at 753-54.
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b. The District Court Concludes that Sexually Violent
Predator Commitments Do Not Comport with
Principles of Substantive Due Process
In addressing the defendant's substantive due process argument,
the court noted that "freedom from bodily restraint" is "[alt the heart
of the liberty interests protected from arbitrary government ac-
tions,"11s and that "[a]bsent clear and convincing evidence of both
mental illness and dangerousness," the detention of the mentally ill is
impermissible.119 The court then rejected the state's argument (and,
at least implicitly, the Washington Supreme Court's holding) that the
statute satisfied this standard, finding instead that the "mental ill-
ness" requirement was not met and that the statute "permits indefi-
nite incarceration based on little more than a showing of potential
future dangerousness."120 In support of this holding, the court looked
first to the language of the statute and observed that "the legislature's
findings expressly disavow the notion that the targeted group of per-
sons are [sic] mentally ill."121 Instead, "the target group is made up of
individuals 'who do not have a mental disease or defect that renders
them appropriate for the existing involuntary treatment act."' 12 2 The
court also studied the statutory terms "mental abnormality" and "per-
sonality disorder" and concluded that neither was sufficient to satisfy
the mental illness requirement.123 The term "mental abnormality,"
the court noted, "has neither a clinically significant meaning nor a rec-
ognized diagnostic use among treatment professionals." 124 In addi-
tion, the court found that "[tihe choice of [the term] 'mental
abnormality,' as opposed to 'mental illness' or 'mental disorder,"' was
a deliberate decision indicating "that the State did not intend the
Statute to capture only the seriously mentally ill."125 The court also
found that the definition of the term "mental abnormality" provided in
the statute-"a congenital or acquired condition affecting the emo-
tional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to the com-
mission of criminal sexual acts in a degree constituting such person a
menace to the health and safety of others"-"establishes an unaccept-
able tautology: a sexually violent predator suffers from a mental con-
dition that predisposes him or her to commit acts of sexual
118. Id. at 748 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316 (1982)).
119. Id. at 749 (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992); Jones v. United
States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975)).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. (quoting WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010 (West 1992) (current version at
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010 (West 2002))).
123. Id. at 749-50.
124. Id. at 750.
125. Id. at 750 n.2.
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violence."126 The court noted that the term "personality disorder" suf-
fered from this same tautology: "the only observed characteristic of the
disorder is the predisposition to commit sex crimes."127
After completing its review of the statutory language, the court
then turned to the legislative history of the sexual predator commit-
ment statute and concluded that "[tihe Governor's Task Force on Com-
munity Protection . . . plainly intended to craft legislation to permit
the involuntary commitment of persons who are not mentally ill."128
In support of this conclusion, the court quoted the following language
from the task force's final report:
Civil commitment under the involuntary treatment law allows indefinite com-
mitment, but is quite restrictive in its definitions. Under current laws, sexu-
ally violent predators only qualify for civil detention when a mental illness or
mental disorder is present. The Task Force examined the histories of some
individual violent predators who had been judged not to have a mental illness
or mental disorder and therefore were not detainable.
1 2 9
The court also noted,
Indeed, in testimony before the legislature, one member of the Task Force
explained that Washington's traditional civil commitment law, Wash. Rev.
Code § 71.05, et seq., was inappropriate for Earl Shriner, the perpetrator of
the highly publicized assault and mutilation of a young boy, because he was
not mentally ill. SENATE LAW & JUSTICE COMMIrrEE, Testimony of Professor
David Boerner at 1 (Jan. 10, 1990). In describing Earl Shriner, Professor
Boerner stated "Mr. Shriner is not mentally ill as that term is defined. He is
clearly a problem, and clearly very dangerous, but he doesn't suffer from a
classic mental illness."1 3 0
Based upon its review of the statutory language and legislative his-
tory, the court held that "the Sexually Violent Predator Statute, al-
lowing as it does the indefinite confinement of persons who are not
mentally ill, violates the substantive protections of the Due Process
Clause."'131
Since the district court concluded that the sexually violent
predator statute "violate[d] the substantive due process component of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Ex Post Facto Clause, and the
Double Jeopardy Clause," the court granted Young's petition for a writ
of habeas corpus. 13 2 It also placed the sexually violent predator com-
mitment statute into an unusual state of legal tension: though the
statute had been held constitutional by the state supreme court, a fed-
eral district court with jurisdiction in the state found it to be unconsti-
126. Id. at 750 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(2) (West 1992) (current
version at WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(8) (West Supp. 2005))).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. (quoting TASK FORCE ON CMTY. PROTECTION, FINAL REPORT TO BOOTH GARD-
NER, GOVERNOR, STATE OF WASHINGTON, 11-21 (1989)).
130. Id. at 750 n.3.
131. Id. at 751.
132. Id. at 754.
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tutional. This tension lasted until the United States Supreme Court
was presented with an opportunity to consider a similar statute that
was enacted in Kansas, as discussed below.
C. The Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act
On July 1, 1993, Stephanie Schmidt, a nineteen-year-old univer-
sity student, disappeared after accepting a ride home from Donald
Gideon, a coworker at a Pittsburg, Kansas, restaurant. 13 3 Four weeks
later, Gideon confessed to police that he had sexually assaulted and
murdered Stephanie.13 4 At the time of the murder, Gideon was on
supervised release after serving ten years of a twenty-year maximum
sentence for a 1983 rape conviction. 13 5 However, neither Stephanie
nor her employer knew about the conviction because probation and
parole officials were not required to disclose Gideon's criminal
record. 136
Stephanie's parents, Gene and Peggy Schmidt, began a concerted
effort to reform Kansas law relating to sex offenders. 13 7 They formed
a task force that quickly proposed a package of legislation, including
an "Employer Notification" bill that would require parole officers to
notify employers of violent felons' offense histories; an enhanced set of
sentencing guidelines; and a "sexually violent predator" civil commit-
ment procedure modeled after Washington's.13 8 Indeed, the Washing-
ton statute, which had recently been upheld by the Washington
133. John Hart, Crusade for Stephanie: Gene and Peggy Schmidt Remember Their
Murdered Daughter by Trying to Keep Other Daughters Safe, KAN. CITY STAR,
Sept. 8, 1996, at H1. The date of Stephanie's disappearance is also reported as
June 30, 1993. See Steve Fry, Friend's Death Led Prosecutor to Field, TOPEKA
CAPITAL-J., Mar. 18, 2005, at IA. Just before she disappeared, Stephanie had
been celebrating her upcoming birthday, which would have been on July 4. See
id.
134. Fry, supra note 133. Gideon had not been seen since Stephanie's disappearance;
however, he turned himself over to police after he was featured on the television
program America's Most Wanted. Austin T. DesLauriers, Kansas' Sex Offender
Treatment Program: Aims to Reduce Recidivism, CORRECTIONS TODAY, Oct. 2002,
at 118, available at 2002 WLNR 5439192. Gideon ultimately pleaded guilty to
first degree murder and other charges and was sentenced to eighty-eight years in
prison. Fry, supra note 133. But see Robert Boczkiewicz, Judge Denies Murder
Appeal, TOPEKA CAPITAL-J., Dec. 14, 2001, at 3C ("Gideon was sentenced to life in
prison without the possibility of parole for 40 years plus 59 2/3 years for kidnap-
ping, rape, sodomy and murder.").
135. Fry, supra note 133; Kevin Hoffman, Man Leaves Victims'Rights State Post, KAN.
CITY STAR, Nov. 9, 2004, at B4. Gideon abducted and murdered Stephanie nine
months after his release. DesLauriers, supra note 134, at 118.
136. Hoffman, supra note 135.
137. Hart, supra note 133.
138. Kelly A. McCaffrey, The Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators in Kan-
sas: A Modern Law for Modern Times, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 887, 887-89 (1994); see
also S.B. 525, 1994 Leg., Reg. Sess., 1994 Kan. Sess. Laws 1824 (outlining the
civil commitment procedure for sexually violent predators).
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Supreme Court,139 "was copied virtually verbatim and submitted to
the Kansas Legislature,"14o where it passed without significant
opposition. 141
Like the Washington law, the Kansas "sexually violent predator"
commitment statute is based on legislative findings "that there exists
an extremely dangerous group of sexually violent predators who have
a mental abnormality or personality disorder and who are likely to
engage in repeat acts of sexual violence if not treated," and that "the
existing civil commitment procedures . . . are inadequate to address
the special needs of sexually violent predators and the risks they pre-
sent to society." 142 The definitions of the terms "sexually violent
predator" and "mental abnormality" are essentially the same as those
that appear in the Washington statute,143 as is the commitment pro-
cedure itself.144
In August 1994, a petition was filed alleging that Leroy Hendricks,
a convicted sex offender with a history of sexual involvement with
children dating to 1955,145 was a sexually violent predator.146 When
the petition was filed, Hendricks was nearing the completion of a 1984
139. McCaffrey, supra note 138, at 889; see also In re Young, 857 P.2d 989 (Wash.
1993). At the time of these events, the United States District Court for the West-
ern District of Washington had not yet issued its opinion holding the Washington
statute unconstitutional. See Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 745 (W.D.
Wash. 1995).
140. DesLauriers, supra note 134, at 119.
141. "The bill calling for civil commitment passed in the House 101-23 and in the Sen-
ate 40-0 on Wednesday, April 27, 1994. Governor Finney signed the bill on Mon-
day, May 9, 1994." McCaffrey, supra note 138, at 888.
142. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (2005). The "existing civil commitment procedures,"
which were previously codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-2901 to -2944 (1994),
now appear in the Care and Treatment Act for Mentally Ill Persons, KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 59-2945 to -2986 (2005).
143. Compare KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a)-(b) (2005), with WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 71.09.020(8), (16) (West Supp. 2005). The Kansas statute, like the Washington
statute, does not define the term "personality disorder."
144. Compare KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a02 to -29a07 (2005), with WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 71.09.020-060 (West 2002 & Supp. 2005).
145. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 354-55 (1997). The Hendricks opinion states,
[In 1955 ... [Hendricks] exposed his genitals to two young girls. At that
time, he pleaded guilty to indecent exposure. Then, in 1957, he was con-
victed of lewdness involving a young girl and received a brief jail sen-
tence. In 1960, he molested two young boys while he worked for a
carnival. After serving two years in prison for that offense, he was pa-
roled, only to be rearrested for molesting a 7-year-old girl. Attempts
were made to treat him for his sexual deviance, and in 1965 he was con-
sidered "safe to be at large," and was discharged from a state psychiatric
hospital.
Shortly thereafter, however, Hendricks sexually assaulted another
young boy and girl .... He was again imprisoned in 1967, but refused to
participate in a sex offender treatment program, and thus remained in-
carcerated until his parole in 1972 .... [S]oon after his 1972 parole,
Hendricks began to abuse his own stepdaughter and stepson .... Then
2007]
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sentence that "had been imposed in accordance with the State's rec-
ommendation pursuant to a plea agreement." 147 A court considered
the petition and determined that there was probable cause to believe
that Hendricks was a sexually violent predator. 148 A trial was held,
and the jury concluded that Hendricks, who admitted that he re-
mained a pedophile,149 was indeed a sexually violent predator.15o As
a result, he was committed to the care of a state hospital even though
"professionals specifically dedicated to a treatment program for sexu-
ally violent predators were not available at the hospital."151
Hendricks appealed his commitment, arguing, among other things,
that the commitment violated his "substantive due process liberty in-
terest" because it was imposed without a finding that he was "men-
tally ill."152 After studying the Washington Supreme Court's decision
in In re Young 1 53 and the United States District Court's opinion in
Young v. Weston,' 5 4 the Kansas Supreme Court concluded that the
Sexually Violent Predator Act was unconstitutional.155 Its reasoning
paralleled that of the federal court in Washington; specifically, the
Kansas Supreme Court found that the Act was meant primarily "to
continue incarceration and not to provide treatment" and that the Act
permitted commitments in the absence of proof of a "mental illness" in
violation of Addington and Foucha.156
After the Kansas Supreme Court invalidated the Sexually Violent
Predator Act, the State of Kansas submitted a petition for certiorari to
... Hendricks was convicted of "taking indecent liberties" with two ado-
lescent boys [in 1984].
Id. (citation omitted). See also id. at 353 (noting Hendricks' 1984 conviction for
taking "indecent liberties").
146. In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 130-31 (Kan. 1996). Hendricks was approxi-
mately sixty years old when the petition was filed. See id.
147. Id. at 130. In exchange for Hendricks' plea of guilty to two counts of indecent
liberties with a child, "[tihe State dismissed a third count ... and refrained from
requesting imposition of the Habitual Criminal Act." Id. "Under the Habitual
Criminal Act, Hendricks' sentence could have been tripled." Id. at 137.
148. Id. at 130.
149. Id. at 130-31. Hendricks testified at his commitment trial that "When he gets
'stressed out,' he is unable to control the urge to engage in sexual activity with a
child." Id. He also "stated that the only sure way he could keep from sexually
abusing children in the future was 'to die,'" and reportedly told the state's physi-
cian that "treatment is bull-." Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 355.
150. In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 131.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 133.
153. See supra notes 61-104 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 105-32 and accompanying text.
155. In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 133-38.
156. Id. at 136, 137-38.
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the United States Supreme Court. 15 7 The Court granted certiorari
and reversed. 158 First, the Court concluded that, contrary to the hold-
ing of the Kansas Supreme Court, "the Act's definition of 'mental ab-
normality' satisfies 'substantive' due process requirements."159 In
support of this holding, the Court noted that "[alithough freedom from
physical restraint '[is] at the core of the liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action,"' states may pro-
vide "for the forcible civil detainment of people who are unable to con-
trol their behavior and who thereby pose a danger to the public health
and safety," "provided the confinement takes place pursuant to proper
procedures and evidentiary standards."160 The Court agreed that "[a]
finding of dangerousness, standing alone, is ordinarily not a sufficient
ground upon which to justify indefinite involuntary commitment," and
noted that it has "sustained civil commitment statutes when they cou-
pled proof of dangerousness with the proof of some additional factor,
such as a 'mental illness' or 'mental abnormality."1 6 1 The Court
stated that "[t]hese added statutory requirements serve to limit invol-
untary civil confinement to those who suffer from a volitional impair-
ment rendering them dangerous beyond their control," and that
[tihe Kansas Act is plainly of a kind with these other civil commitment stat-
utes: It requires a finding of future dangerousness, and then links that finding
to the existence of a "mental abnormality" or "personality disorder" that
makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the person to control his dangerous
behavior. 162
In other words, proof of a "mental abnormality" or "personality disor-
der" as defined in the Act is sufficient to justify a civil commitment
because "it narrows the class of persons eligible for confinement to
those who are unable to control their dangerousness."'16 3
The Court then turned to Hendricks' arguments that the Sexually
Violent Predator Act violated the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto
157. Hendricks filed a cross-petition in which he reasserted his ex post facto and
double jeopardy claims, which were not addressed in the Kansas Supreme
Court's majority opinion. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 350 (1997).
158. See id.
159. Id. at 356.
160. Id. at 356-57 (citations omitted) (quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80
(1992)).
161. Id. at 358 (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 314-15 (1993) (permitting commit-
ment of"mentally retarded" or "mentally ill" and dangerous individuals); Allen v.
Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 366 (1986) (permitting commitment of "mentally ill" and
dangerous individual); Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey
County, 309 U.S. 270, 271-72 (1940) (permitting commitment of dangerous indi-
vidual with "psychopathic personality")).
162. Id. (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(b) (1994)).
163. Id.
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Clauses. 164 Recognizing that both arguments depended upon the the-
ory that the Act "establishes criminal proceedings," the Court, like the
courts in Washington, began by considering whether the Act is best
categorized as "civil" or "criminal."165 First, the Court concluded that
"the legislature meant the statute to establish 'civil' proceedings," not-
ing that "[n]othing on the face of the statute suggests that the legisla-
ture sought to create anything other than a civil commitment scheme
designed to protect the public from harm."166
Next, the Court considered whether "'the statutory scheme [is] so
punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State's] intention'
to deem it 'civil."167 In making this determination, the Court found
first that "commitment under the Act does not implicate either of the
two primary objectives of criminal punishment: retribution or deter-
rence."168 The Court explained,
The Act's purpose is not retributive because it does not affix culpability for
prior criminal conduct. Instead, such conduct is used solely for evidentiary
purposes, either to demonstrate that a "mental abnormality" exists or to sup-
port a finding of future dangerousness. We have previously concluded that an
Illinois statute was nonpunitive even though it was triggered by the commis-
sion of a sexual assault, explaining that evidence of the prior criminal conduct
was "received not to punish past misdeeds, but primarily to show the ac-
cused's mental condition and to predict future behavior." In addition, the
Kansas Act does not make a criminal conviction a prerequisite for commit-
ment-persons absolved of criminal responsibility may nonetheless be subject
to confinement under the Act. An absence of the necessary criminal responsi-
bility suggests that the State is not seeking retribution for a past misdeed.
Thus, the fact that the Act may be "tied to criminal activity" is "insufficient to
render the statut[e] punitive."1 6 9
The Court also noted that the absence of a scienter requirement pro-
vided additional support for the conclusion that the Act was not in-
tended to be retributive.17o Turning then to the second basic objective
of criminal punishment-i.e., deterrence-the Court stated,
Nor can it be said that the legislature intended the Act to function as a
deterrent. Those persons committed under the Act are, by definition, suffer-
ing from a "mental abnormality" or a "personality disorder" that prevents
them from exercising adequate control over their behavior. Such persons are
therefore unlikely to be deterred by the threat of confinement. And the condi-
tions surrounding that confinement do not suggest a punitive purpose on the
State's part. The State has represented that an individual confined under the
164. Id. at 360-71. The Kansas Supreme Court determined that it need not address
these arguments in view of its finding that the Act violated the Due Process
Clause. See In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 138 (Kan. 1996).
165. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361.
166. Id.
167. Id. (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980)).
168. Id. at 361-62.
169. Id. at 362 (citations omitted) (quoting Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 371 (1986);
United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 292 (1996)).
170. Id. (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963)).
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Act is not subject to the more restrictive conditions placed on state prisoners,
but instead experiences essentially the same conditions as any involuntarily
committed patient in the state mental institution. Because none of the parties
argues that people institutionalized under the Kansas general civil commit-
ment statute are subject to punitive conditions, even though they may be in-
voluntarily confined, it is difficult to conclude that persons confined under this
Act are being "punished."1 7 1
The Court found next that although the commitment procedure in-
volves an affirmative restraint, this "does not inexorably lead to the
conclusion that the government has imposed punishment."172 The
Court stated, "If detention for the purpose of protecting the commu-
nity from harm necessarily constituted punishment, then all involun-
tary civil commitments would have to be considered punishment." 7 3
Finally, the Court rejected each of the three main counterargu-
ments that Hendricks advanced in support of his claim that sexually
violent predator commitments are punitive in nature. Hendricks first
suggested that "his confinement's potentially indefinite duration
[amounts to] evidence of the State's punitive intent."74 The Court
dismissed this suggestion out-of-hand, stating, "Far from any punitive
objective, the confinement's duration is instead linked to the stated
purposes of the commitment, namely, to hold the person until his
mental abnormality no longer causes him to be a threat to others."175
The Court also recognized that "[t]he maximum amount of time an
individual can be incapacitated pursuant to a single judicial proceed-
ing is one year."' 7 6 Second, Hendricks claimed "that the State's use of
procedural safeguards traditionally found in criminal trials makes the
proceedings . . .criminal rather than civil."177 However, the Court
found that the safeguards simply "demonstrate that the Kansas Legis-
lature has taken great care to confine only a narrow class of particu-
larly dangerous individuals, and then only after meeting the strictest
procedural standards."178 Finally, Hendricks argued "that the Act is
necessarily punitive because it fails to offer any legitimate 'treat-
ment."'179 The Court addressed this argument at length, noting first
that even if Hendricks' condition is untreatable, it does not follow that
his commitment must be punitive.1SO The Court reasoned,
171. Id. at 362-63 (citation omitted).
172. Id. at 363 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987)).
173. Id. (emphasis omitted).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 364 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a08 (1994)). "If Kansas seeks to con-
tinue the detention beyond that year, a court must once again determine beyond
a reasonable doubt that the detainee satisfies the same standards as required for
the initial confinement." Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 365.
180. Id. at 365-66.
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We have already observed that, under the appropriate circumstances and
when accompanied by proper procedures, incapacitation may be a legitimate
end of the civil law.... A State could hardly be seen as furthering a "punitive"
purpose by involuntarily confining persons afflicted with an untreatable,
highly contagious disease. Similarly, it would be of little value to require
treatment as a precondition for civil confinement of the dangerously insane
when no acceptable treatment existed. To conclude otherwise would obligate
a State to release certain confined individuals who were both mentally ill and
dangerous simply because they could not be successfully treated for their
afflictions. -8 1
The Court also rejected the notion that the State's failure to make
treatment its first priority did not render Hendricks' commitment pu-
nitive, because "critical language in the Act itself demonstrates that
the [secretary of social and rehabilitation services], under whose cus-
tody sexually violent predators are committed, has an obligation to
provide treatment to individuals like Hendricks."' 8 2 The Court mini-
mized the implications of the fact that "the treatment program ini-
tially offered Hendricks may have seemed somewhat meager," stating
that "it must be remembered that he was the first person committed
under the Act," and "[t]hat the State did not have all of its treatment
procedures in place is thus not surprising."' 8 3 The Court also noted
that "Hendricks was placed under the supervision of the Kansas De-
partment of Health and Social and Rehabilitative Services, housed in
a unit segregated from the general prison population and operated not
by the employees of the Department of Corrections, but by other
trained individuals."i8 4
In light of the Court's finding that commitments under the Kansas
Sexually Violent Predator Act are not punitive, Hendricks's double
jeopardy and ex post facto claims necessarily failed.' 8 5 Since the
Court also found that the Act "comports with due process require-
ments," the judgment of the Kansas Supreme Court holding the Act
unconstitutional was reversed.' 8 6
D. The Aftermath of Hendricks
Two important issues arose in the wake of the Supreme Court's
decision in Hendricks. First, Hendricks had direct implications for
Andre Brigham Young, the successful habeas corpus petitioner in
Washington. Although Hendricks decimated Young's original legal
position, Young did find an alternate avenue of attack that was meri-
torious enough to require specific attention from the Court. Second,
181. Id. (citations omitted).
182. Id. at 367 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07(a) (1994)).
183. Id. at 367-68.
184. Id. at 368.
185. Id. at 369-71.
186. Id. at 371.
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Hendricks raised a new practical question for the lower courts: How
should the Court's substantive due process analysis and, more specifi-
cally, its holding that "mental abnormalities" and "personality disor-
ders" are sufficient to justify civil commitments when they "narrow[ I
the class of persons eligible for confinement to those who are unable to
control their dangerousness," 8 7 be interpreted and applied? Ulti-
mately, the Court was called upon to resolve this question as well.
Each of these issues is discussed below.
1. Andre Brigham Young and the Notion that a Statute Might
Be Punitive "As Applied"
After the Supreme Court's decision in Hendricks, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit remanded Young's case to the
United States District Court for the Western District of Washington
for reconsideration.l 8 8 On remand, the district court denied Young's
habeas petition.1s 9 Young appealed, and the Ninth Circuit reversed
the district court's decision in part.190 The court noted that, while
"Hendricks forecloses the claim that the Washington statute, on its
face, violates the ex post facto and double jeopardy clauses," it "does
not preclude the possibility that the Washington statute, as applied, is
punitive."191 The court held that Young "alleged sufficient facts that,
if proved, would constitute.. . 'clear proof [that the statutory scheme
is punitive in effect]."192 These facts included the following: (1)
"Young is subject to conditions more restrictive than those placed ei-
ther on true civil commitment detainees or even those placed on state
prisoners"; (2) "Young has been subject to such conditions for more
than seven years"; (3) "[tlhe Special Commitment Center is located
wholly within the perimeter of a larger Department of Corrections fa-
cility and relies on the Department of Corrections for a host of essen-
tial services, including library services, medical care, food, and
security"; (4) "Itihe conditions of confinement at the Special Commit-
ment Center are not compatible with the Washington statute's treat-
ment purposes"; (5) "[tihe Conditions and restrictions at the Special
Commitment Center are not reasonably related to a legitimate non-
punitive goal"; (6) "[tlhe conditions of confinement at the Special Com-
mitment Center do not comport with substantive due process"; (7)
"[c]ourt-appointed Resident Advocate, psychologist Stanley Green-
berg, concluded in his final report, ... 'I have come to suspect that [the
Special Commitment Center] is designed . . . , either overtly or co-
187. Id. at 350.
188. Young v. Weston, 122 F.3d 38 (9th Cir. 1997).
189. See Young v. Weston, 192 F.3d 870, 873 (9th Cir. 1999).
190. Id. at 872.
191. Id. at 874.
192. Id.
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vertly, to punish and confine these men and women to a life sentence
without any hope of release to a less restrictive setting"'; (8) "[tlhe De-
partment of Corrections staffs role in running the Special Commit-
ment Center had increased"; (9) "Special Commitment Center
residents were housed in units that were, according to Special Master
Janice Marques, 'clearly inappropriate for individuals in a mental
health treatment program'"; and (10) "[tlhere were still no certified
sex-offender treatment providers at Special Commitment Center."'19 3
The Ninth Circuit found that because the "state courts did not afford
Young a full and fair hearing concerning the conditions of confinement
in the Special Commitment Center," Young was entitled to an eviden-
tiary hearing in federal court.' 9 4 Since the district court did not con-
duct such a hearing, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case for that
purpose.19 5
Before this hearing was held, the Supreme Court granted certio-
rari to resolve the conflict between the Ninth Circuit's holding in
Young and the Washington Supreme Court's holding in In re
Turay,196 wherein the court rejected a defendant's argument "that the
conditions of confinement at the Center rendered the Washington Act
punitive 'as applied' to him in violation of the Double Jeopardy
Clause."19 7 The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's holding, stating,
We hold that respondent cannot obtain release through an "as-applied" chal-
lenge to the Washington Act on double jeopardy and ex post facto grounds. We
agree with petitioner that an "as-applied" analysis would prove unworkable.
Such an analysis would never conclusively resolve whether a particular
scheme is punitive and would thereby prevent a final determination of the
scheme's validity under the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses....
The particular features of confinement may affect how a confinement scheme
is evaluated to determine whether it is civil rather than punitive, but it re-
mains no less true that the query must be answered definitively. The civil
nature of a confinement scheme cannot be altered based merely on vagaries in
the implementation of the authorizing statute. 1 9 8
The Court was careful to note, however, that its decision did not mean
that persons "committed as sexually violent predators have no remedy
for the alleged conditions and treatment regime at the Center."' 99
Specifically, the Court observed that persons committed under the Act
have a statutory "right to adequate care and individualized treat-
ment"; that a challenge to the commitment scheme might be based on
the due process requirement "that the conditions and duration of con-
finement under the Act bear some reasonable relation to the purpose
193. Id. at 875 (footnotes omitted).
194. Id. at 876.
195. Id. at 877.
196. 986 P.2d 790 (Wash. 1999).
197. Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 257, 260 (2001).
198. Id. at 263 (citation omitted).
199. Id. at 265.
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for which persons are committed"; and that the center was already
operating under an injunction, issued in a § 1983 action, that required
it to address many of the concerns raised by Young.20 0
2. The Inability to Control One's Dangerousness
As noted above, in Hendricks the Supreme Court determined that
the statutory requirements of mental abnormality and personality dis-
order satisfy substantive due process requirements because they serve
to limit "the class of persons eligible for confinement to those who are
unable to control their dangerousness."201 The Kansas Supreme
Court attempted to apply this concept in its review of a challenge
brought by Michael T. Crane, a convicted sex offender who had been
committed as a sexually violent predator. 20 2
On January 6, 1993, Crane exposed himself to a tanning salon at-
tendant. 20 3 Thirty minutes later, he entered a video store, waited un-
til he was the only customer in the store, and grabbed the clerk. 20 4
"With his genitals exposed, he lifted and pushed her and squeezed her
neck with his hands."205 Crane ordered the clerk to perform oral sex
upon him and threatened to rape her, but "[t]he attack ended when
Crane suddenly stopped and ran out of the store."206 Crane was con-
victed of "lewd and lascivious behavior" based upon the incident at the
tanning salon, and this conviction was affirmed on appeal. 207 How-
ever, Crane's convictions of attempted aggravated criminal sodomy,
attempted rape, and kidnapping based upon the incident at the video
store were reversed. 20 8 The sodomy and rape charges were refiled,
and, pursuant to a plea agreement, Crane pleaded guilty to a single
count of aggravated sexual battery. 20 9
Thereafter, the State filed a petition to commit Crane as a sexually
violent predator.210 Evidence presented at the commitment trial indi-
cated that Crane suffered from "antisocial personality disorder" and
"exhibitionism," and a psychologist testified that these disorders, in
combination, made Crane a sexually violent predator.2 11
200. Id. at 265-66; see also Turay v. Seling, 108 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1154-55 (W.D.
Wash. 2000) (finding that the center had taken steps to fulfill the injunction's
requirements).
201. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997).
202. In re Crane, 7 P.3d 285, 286 (Kan. 2000).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 286-87.
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Crane challenged his commitment on the ground that under Hen-
dricks, it was not "constitutionally permissible to commit [him] as a
sexual predator absent a showing that he was unable to control his
dangerous behavior."212 The Kansas Supreme Court agreed.2 13 The
court recognized that the Sexually Violent Predator Act "does not ex-
pressly prohibit confinement absent a finding of uncontrollable dan-
gerousness."2 14 Indeed, the court observed that the Act specifically
states that sexually violent predator commitments can be based upon
mental impairments that affect volitional or emotional capacity, and
that an impairment that affected emotional capacity might not affect
a person's ability to control his conduct. 2 1 5 Noting, however, that the
majority opinion in Hendricks is "replete with references to the com-
mitment of persons who cannot control their own behavior,"2 16 the
court ultimately concluded that Hendricks "read[s] a requirement of
inability to control behavior into the Act in order to uphold its consti-
tutionality."2 17 Since the jury had not been instructed to determine
whether Crane was unable to control his behavior, the court re-
manded the case for a new commitment trial.218
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that
the Kansas Supreme Court "interpreted . . . Hendricks in an overly
restrictive manner."219 The Court explained that "Hendricks set forth
no requirement of total or complete lack of control." 22 0 Rather, "there
must be proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior" that,
when viewed in light of such features of the case as the nature of the psychiat-
ric diagnosis, and the severity of the mental abnormality itself, must be suffi-
cient to distinguish the dangerous sexual offender whose serious mental
illness, abnormality, or disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the
dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case. 2 2 1
212. Id. at 287.
213. Id. at 290.
214. Id. at 289.
215. See id. at 289-90.
216. Id. at 288 (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357-58, 360, 362, 364
(1997)).
217. Id. at 290.
218. Id. The court also considered and rejected Crane's arguments that the Sexually
Violent Predator Act, as applied to him, violated the Ex Post Facto and Double
Jeopardy Clauses. See id. at 290-92. However, the court seemed to reject
Crane's arguments reluctantly, in part because it believed that Justice Kennedy's
concurrence in Hendricks could be read to support the notion that "the determi-
nation whether punishment is being imposed is factual[,] so... it may vary from
case to case." Id. at 291. As noted above, the Supreme Court later concluded that
"as-applied" ex post facto and double jeopardy challenges cannot proceed. Seling
v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 263 (2001); see supra notes 197-98 and accompanying
text.
219. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 409 (2002).
220. Id. at 411.
221. Id. at 413 (citing Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357-58; Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S.
71, 82-83 (1992)).
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The Court also noted, however, that it "had no occasion [either in
Crane or in Hendricks] to consider whether confinement based solely
on 'emotional' abnormality would be constitutional." 22 2
E. Conclusion
Throughout American legal history, sex offenders have been classi-
fied and dealt with alternately as "criminals" or mentally ill "devi-
ants." Certain sex offenders are deemed to be both, however, under
Washington's sexually violent predator commitment procedure. This
procedure, which was subsequently adopted in Kansas, facilitates the
civil commitment of sex offenders upon their release from prison and
thereby allows their incapacitation to continue without interruption.
The sexually violent predator commitment procedure achieves this
continued incapacitation by shifting the justification for the incapaci-
tation from a criminal conviction to a civil commitment. By definition,
however, sexual predators lack the sort of psychological impairments
that would render them eligible for ordinary civil commitments.223
Instead, their commitments are justified on the basis of mental abnor-
malities or personality disorders which make them likely to engage in
"predatory acts of sexual violence" if they are not confined. 2 24
Courts have struggled to determine whether the "mental abnor-
mality or personality disorder" commitment standard is consistent
with the substantive requirements of due process; indeed, courts that
have considered the question have arrived at opposite conclusions.225
The Supreme Court resolved the issue by holding that the standard is
sufficient to justify civil commitments because "[it requires a finding
of future dangerousness, and then links that finding to the existence
of a 'mental abnormality' or 'personality disorder' that makes it diffi-
cult, if not impossible, for the person to control his dangerous behav-
ior."226 The Court later clarified that in order to "distinguish[] a
dangerous sexual offender subject to civil commitment 'from other
dangerous persons who are perhaps more properly dealt with exclu-
sively through criminal proceedings,"'227 "there must be proof of seri-
ous difficulty in controlling behavior." 228 However, the Court left
open the question of whether a sexual predator commitment may be
222. Id. at 415.
223. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010 (West 2002).
224. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(16) (West Supp. 2005).
225. Compare, e.g., In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 1001-04 (Wash. 1993), with Young v.
Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 748-51 (W.D. Wash. 1995).
226. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(b) (1994)).
227. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412 (2002) (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 360).
228. Id. at 413.
2007]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
based on a purely emotional (i.e., completely nonvolitional)
impairment. 2 29
Courts that have considered whether sexually violent predator
commitments are truly civil or criminal in nature have also reached
opposite conclusions.230 Ultimately, the Supreme Court found that
the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act did not establish a criminal
proceeding, in part because the statute did "not implicate either of the
two primary objectives of criminal punishment: retribution or deter-
rence."2 3 1 The Court also found that the conditions of confinement did
"not suggest a punitive purpose on the State's part," and it noted that
since no party argued "that people institutionalized under the Kansas
general civil commitment statute are subject to punitive conditions,
... it is difficult to conclude that persons confined under this Act are
being 'punished."' 23 2 Andre Brigham Young, who had been committed
as a sexual predator in Washington, seized upon this latter statement
and challenged his commitment on the ground that the conditions of
his own confinement rendered the commitment statute punitive as ap-
plied to him.2 33 The Court rejected Young's challenge, holding "that
an 'as-applied' analysis would prove unworkable" and "would never
conclusively resolve whether a particular scheme is punitive."2 34
However, the Court observed that sexually violent predators might
base challenges to the conditions of their confinement on other theo-
ries, including a statute-based right to adequate care or a due process
challenge based on the requirement "that the conditions and duration
of confinement under the Act bear some reasonable relation to the
purpose for which persons are committed." 23 5
As the constitutionality of sexual predator commitments became
more firmly established, more states began adopting similar commit-
ment statutes. 236 Nebraska's recently adopted version of the sexual
predator commitment procedure is described below.
III. THE NEBRASKA SEX OFFENDER COMMITMENT ACT
Motivated in part by a pair of assaults perpetrated by former re-
sidents of a mental health center's sex offender unit, the Nebraska
229. Id. at 415.
230. Compare, e.g., In re Young, 857 P.2d at 996-1000, with Young, 898 F. Supp. at
751-53.
231. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361-62.
232. Id. at 363.
233. See Young v. Weston, 192 F.3d 870, 874-75 (9th Cir. 1999).
234. Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 263 (2001).
235. Id. at 265 (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 79 (1992); Youngberg v. Ro-
meo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972)).
236. See John W. Parry, Shrinking Civil Rights of Alleged Sexually Violent Predators,
25 MENTAL & PHYsIcAL DISABILITY L. REP. 318, 321 (2001).
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Legislature passed a package of sex offender provisions in 2006.237
The new legislation includes a commitment procedure that, like the
sexual predator commitment procedures adopted in Washington and
Kansas, facilitates the civil commitment of sex offenders who are
nearing the end of their prison terms. 238 This Part describes Ne-
braska's new commitment procedure and compares it to the Washing-
ton and Kansas procedures.
A. Background
In April 2004, Roger Einspahr, a former resident of the Lincoln
(Nebraska) Regional Center's sex offender unit, "dragged a boy from
his bicycle in a west Lincoln neighborhood, took the boy into his bed-
room [at a group home] and stabbed him with a knife."2 39 Within
eighteen months, Joseph Siems, Jr., another former resident of the
Lincoln Regional Center, traveled on a crosstown bus to Arnold Ele-
mentary School in Lincoln, Nebraska; hid himself in a bathroom; and
sexually assaulted a five-year-old boy.240
The Einspahr and Siems incidents spurred a series of community
and governmental responses. Einspahr's assault provoked outrage
from residents living near his group home,2 4 1 and Nebraska Governor
Mike Johanns ordered a review to determine whether "people with
profiles similar to ... Einspahr['s . .. [were] in secure residences."2 42
This review led directly to the creation of a new program at the Has-
tings (Nebraska) Regional Center to provide a "more structured, se-
237. See infra section III.A.
238. See infra sections III.B-C.
239. Nate Jenkins, Sex Assaults Spur Audit of Programs, LINCOLN J. STAR, Feb. 5,
2006, at 1A, available at http://www.journalstar.com/articles/2006/02/05/local/
doc43e560a3b9049598347546.txt. Initially, Einspahr was charged with kidnap-
ping, second-degree assault, and using a weapon to commit a felony; however, the
charges were dropped and civil commitment proceedings were initiated after he
was found to lack competence to proceed to trial. Margaret Reist, Group-home
Resident Charges Dropped, LINCOLN J. STAR, Nov. 5, 2004, at 1B, available at
http://www.journalstar.com/articles/2004/11/04/top-story/extras/
doc418b105d7b365046518332.txt.
240. Jenkins, supra note 239; Butch Mabin & Gwen Tietgen, Siems Gets 20-30 Years,
LINCOLN J. STAR, Jan. 18, 2006, at 1A, available at http://www.journalstar.com/
articles/2006/01/18local/doc43cd882d56518711098841.txt. Siems, who report-
edly "had a history of sexual deviancy," pleaded guilty to first-degree sexual as-
sault of a child, and was sentenced to 20-30 years imprisonment. Id.
241. Leah Thorsen & Chris Aponick, Neighbors Demand Answers, LINCOLN J. STAR,
Apr. 10, 2004, at 1A, available at http://www.journalstar.com/articles/2004/04/10/
top-story/10047936.txt.
242. Leah Thorsen, Attack on Boy Sparks Inquiry, LINCOLN J. STAR, Apr. 9, 2004,
at 1A, available at http://www.journalstar.com/articles/2004/04/09/local/100479
16.txt.
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cure environment" for adults with developmental disabilities.243
After the Siems assault, a committee of state senators ordered an au-
dit of the sex offender treatment programs at the Lincoln Regional
Center. 24 4 In addition, during the 2006 legislative session, state sena-
tors proposed at least eight different bills concerning "sexual
predators." 245 One of these bills, Legislative Bill 1199, was passed by
the legislature without a dissenting vote2 46 and was signed by Ne-
braska Governor Dave Heineman on April 13, 2006.247 The bill
amended the criminal code to redefine sexual offenses against chil-
dren; increased "the penalty for a second conviction for failing to com-
ply with the [sex offender] registration requirements"; "[e]xpand[ed]
the list of offenses that... require registration under [Nebraska's] Sex
Offender Registration Act"; lengthened the post-release supervision of
certain sex offenders; authorized municipalities to impose residency
restrictions on sex offenders; and directed the creation of a working
group to study "sex offender treatment and management."248 It also
created a new civil commitment procedure for sex offenders called "the
Sex Offender Commitment Act."249
243. Nancy Hicks, Stabbing Leads to New Program, LINCOLN J. STAR, Sept. 16, 2004,
at 2B, available at http://www.journalstar.com/articles/2004/09/16/nebraska/
10055092.txt.
244. Jenkins, supra note 239.
245. Nancy Hicks, Senators Focus on Sex Assault Restrictions, LINCOLN J. STAR, Feb.
13, 2006, at 1A, available at http://www.journalstar.com/articles/2006/02/13/local/
doc43efce8a8c55f516097252.txt.
246. Governor Dave Heineman, Official Nebraska Government Website, A Productive
Session (April 17, 2006), http://www.gov.state.ne.us/archive/columns/2006/0417.
html.
247. L.B. 1199, 99th Leg., 2d Sess. (Neb. 2006). Interestingly, a few weeks before the
signing of Legislative Bill 1199, the Lincoln Journal Star reported that sex of-
fenses were on the decline nationwide and in Nebraska. See Nate Jenkins, States
Get Tough While Sex Offenses on Decline, LINCOLN J. STAR, Mar. 19, 2006, at 1A,
available at http://www.journalstar.com/articles/2006/03/19/top-story/extras/doc
441cb41c44c27776003376.txt.
248. JUDICIARY COMM., INTRODUCER'S STATEMENT OF INTENT: L.B. 1199, 99th Leg., 2d
Sess. (Neb. 2006), available at http://srvwww.unicam.state.ne.us/unicamAllD-
rafting.html (search "Search Drafting for" for "LB 1199" in the "99th - Statements
of Intent" index; then follow link for "Microsoft Word - SI LB1199.doc"); JUDICl-
ARY COMM., COMMITTEE STATEMENT: L.B. 1199, 99th Leg., 2d Sess., at 3 (Neb.
2006), available at http://srvwww.unicam.state.ne.us/unicamAllDrafting.html
(search "Search Drafting for" for "LB 1199" in the "99th - Committee Statements"
index; then follow link for "Microsoft Word - CS LB1199.doc").
249. L.B. 1199, §§ 57-82, 86-91. The bill states that only sections 57 through 82 "may
be cited as the Sex Offender Commitment Act." Id. § 57. However, key defini-
tions are set forth in section 87, and, as shown below, sections 86 through 91
contain provisions that are analogous to those found in the Washington and Kan-
sas sexually violent predator statutes. See infra section III.C. For the purposes
of this Article, references to the Sex Offender Commitment Act should be read to
include sections 86 through 91 of Legislative Bill 1199.
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B. The Sex Offender Commitment Act: A Brief Overview
Nebraska's Sex Offender Commitment Act is designed "to provide
for the court-ordered treatment of ['dangerous] sex offenders['] who
have completed their sentences but continue to pose a threat of harm
to others."250 The Act defines a "dangerous sex offender" as:
(a) a person who suffers from a mental illness which makes the person likely
to engage in repeat acts of sexual violence, who has been convicted of one or
more sex offenses, and who is substantially unable to control his or her crimi-
nal behavior or (b) a person with a personality disorder which makes the per-
son likely to engage in repeat acts of sexual violence, who has been convicted
of two or more sex offenses, and who is substantially unable to control his or
her criminal behavior.
2 5 1
If a county attorney believes that a person is a dangerous sex of-
fender and that the person should be subject to an involuntary treat-
ment order, he or she must file a petition to initiate proceedings under
the Act. 2 52 After the petition is filed, a mental health board 25 3 must
hold a hearing "to determine whether there is clear and convincing
evidence that the subject [of the petition] is a dangerous sex offender
as alleged in the petition." 254 If the subject denies the petition's alle-
gations, the state must attempt to prove that the subject is a danger-
ous sex offender and that
250. L.B. 1199, § 58.
251. Id. § 87(1).
252. Id. § 61. Persons alleged to be "dangerous sex offenders" are brought to the at-
tention of county attorneys in various ways. See, e.g., id. § 60 (providing that
mental health professionals must submit a certificate to the county attorney upon
determining that a person admitted for emergency protective custody is a danger-
ous sex offender); id. § 61 (providing that "[any person who believes that another
person is a dangerous sex offender may communicate such belief to the county
attorney"); id. § 77 (providing that a mental health board must be notified of the
release of any individual committed by the board, and that the board must for-
ward that notice to the county attorney); id. § 86 (providing that an agency with
jurisdiction over a person who is required to register as a sex offender must notify
the county attorney, among others, at least ninety days before that person's re-
lease from incarceration or civil commitment or the termination of that person's
probation or parole supervision); id. § 88 (providing that the Department of Cor-
rections must evaluate certain convicted offenders prior to their scheduled re-
lease to determine whether they are dangerous sex offenders and notify the
county attorney, among others, of the findings).
253. Mental health boards, which are created by "[tihe presiding judge[s] in each dis-
trict court judicial district," perform various functions specified in the Nebraska
Mental Health Commitment Act. NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-915 (Cum. Supp. 2006).
Each board consists of a licensed Nebraska attorney, who serves as the board's
chair, "and any two of the following but not more than one from each category: A
physician, a psychologist, a psychiatric social worker, a psychiatric nurse, a
clinical social worker, or a layperson with a demonstrated interest in mental
health and substance dependency issues." Id. As the following discussion illus-
trates, the Sex Offender Commitment Act assigns additional duties to the mental
health boards.
254. L.B. 1199, § 64.
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neither voluntary hospitalization nor other treatment alternatives less re-
strictive of the subject's liberty than inpatient or outpatient treatment or-
dered by the mental health board are available or would suffice to prevent the
harm described in subdivision (1) of section 87 of this act.2 5 5
Subdivision (1) of section 87 of the Act simply defines the term "dan-
gerous sex offender," so, presumably, the "harm described" in that
subsection is the likelihood that the subject of the petition will "engage
in repeat acts of sexual violence." 256
If, at the conclusion of the hearing, the mental health board deter-
mines that the subject is not a dangerous sex offender, the subject
must be discharged unconditionally. 2 57 If the board determines "that
the subject is a dangerous sex offender, but that voluntary hospitaliza-
tion or other treatment alternatives less restrictive of the subject's lib-
erty than treatment ordered by the mental health board" are both
available and adequate, the board may discharge the subject uncondi-
tionally or suspend proceedings for up to ninety days "to permit the
subject to obtain voluntary treatment."258 If the board finds that the
subject is a dangerous sex offender and that less restrictive treatment
alternatives must be ruled out, the board must order the subject to
receive inpatient or outpatient treatment.2 5 9 The Act provides, how-
ever, that "[i]npatient hospitalization or custody shall only be consid-
ered as a treatment alternative of last resort."260 Subjects ordered to
receive treatment are assigned a treatment plan,261 and their pro-
gress under the plan must be reported to the mental health board at
regular intervals. 26 2 Upon the filing of each progress report, a subject
may demand a review hearing before the board and request an order
of discharge. 2 63
255. Id. § 65(1).
256. See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
257. L.B. 1199, § 65(2).
258. Id. § 65(3). During the suspension period, the county attorney may apply to rein-
state the proceedings against the subject. If no such application is filed, the
board must order the unconditional discharge of the person at the conclusion of
the period. Id.
259. Id. § 65(4). The same result ensues if the subject admits the allegations set forth
in the petition. See id.
260. Id. § 65(6).
261. Id. § 71.
262. Id. § 72. Throughout the first year of a subject's commitment, progress reports
must be submitted every ninety days. Thereafter, progress reports follow at six-
month intervals. Id.
263. Id. § 75.
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C. A Comparison of the Sex Offender Commitment Act and
the Sexually Violent Predator Commitment
Procedures
Nebraska's Sex Offender Commitment Act differs from the sexu-
ally violent predator legislation adopted in Washington and Kansas in
many respects. For example, in Washington and Kansas, a judge pre-
sides over the sexual predator commitment proceedings; the commit-
ment criteria must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt; and any
party or the court may demand a jury.2 6 4 In contrast, under Ne-
braska's procedure, dangerous sex offenders are subject to involuntary
treatment after a mental health board determines that the commit-
ment criteria are supported by clear and convincing evidence. 26 5 An-
other significant distinction lies in the various acts' provisions
concerning the availability of "less restrictive" treatment alternatives.
Nebraska's Sex Offender Commitment Act expresses a clear prefer-
ence for voluntary treatment, 2 66 lists involuntary confinement as a
treatment of "last resort,"267 and assigns to the state the burden of
proving that certain "less restrictive" treatment alternatives are un-
suitable in a given case. 268 In Washington and Kansas, the state
bears no such burden during a sexual predator commitment trial;269
264. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a06, 59-29a07 (2005); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 71.09.050(3), 71.09.060(1) (West 2002 & Supp. 2005).
265. L.B. 1199, §§ 64-65. It should be noted that a dangerous sex offender may appeal
a mental health board's treatment order to the district court, which reviews the
appeal "de novo on the record." Id. § 70.
266. Id. § 58 ("It is the public policy of the State of Nebraska that dangerous sex of-
fenders be encouraged to obtain voluntary treatment.").
267. Id. § 65(6).
268. Id. § 65.
269. See In re Detention of Taylor, 134 P.3d 254, 261 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) ("[T]he
Washington Supreme Court effectively relieved the State of its previous obliga-
tion to prove that [an alleged predator] was not safe to be released to a less re-
strictive alternative to total confinement."). As noted above, sexually violent
predator commitments in Washington are reviewed on at least an annual basis,
and if less restrictive alternatives are deemed to be appropriate, they may be
imposed following those reviews. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
The Kansas statute provides that if a person is found to be a sexually violent
predator, he must be committed "for control, care and treatment [at a facility
operated by the department of social and rehabilitation services] until such time
as the person's mental abnormality or personality disorder has so changed that
the person is safe to be at large." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07(a) (2005). "At all
times, persons committed for control, care and treatment . . . shall be kept in a
secure facility ...." Id. § 59-29a07(b). The statute includes no mention of least
restrictive alternatives; however, it does provide for an annual review procedure,
which can lead to the "transitional release" of a sexually violent predator. See id.
§ 59-29a08.
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indeed, Washington's statute defines sexually violent predators as
persons who must be "confined in a secure facility."2 70
Other, more subtle differences-along with several similarities-
emerge upon close inspection of the Sex Offender Commitment Act's
definition of a "[d]angerous sex offender."271 Four main elements in-
here in this definition, and each of these elements will be compared, in
turn, with corresponding provisions of the Washington and Kansas
predator statutes.
First, in order to qualify as a "dangerous sex offender" in Ne-
braska, a person must suffer from a "mental illness" or a "personality
disorder."27 2 The terms "mental illness" and "personality disorder"
seem to parallel the "mental abnormality [and] personality disorder"
commitment criteria in Washington and Kansas. 2 73 It should be
noted, however, that the Nebraska statute's definition of the term
"mental illness" is taken directly from the Nebraska Mental Health
Commitment Act, 2 74 which is the state's "standard" civil commitment
statute;2 7 5 in contrast, the term "mental abnormality" is unique to the
Washington and Kansas sexually violent predator acts-that is, it is
not found elsewhere in those states' civil commitment statutes. 27 6
Second, a dangerous sex offender's mental illness or personality
disorder must make him "likely to engage in repeat acts of sexual vio-
270. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(16) (West Supp. 2005). See also KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 59-29a01 (2005) (noting that the dangers presented by sexually violent
predators make "it ... necessary to house involuntarily committed sexually vio-
lent predators in an environment separate from persons" committed under the
state's standard civil commitment procedures); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 71.09.015 (West 2002) ("The legislature hereby clarifies that it intends.. . that
the court and jury be presented only with conditions that would exist or that the
court would have the authority to order in the absence of a finding that the per-
son is a sexually violent predator.").
271. L.B. 1199, § 87(1).
272. Id.
273. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a)-(b) (2005); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 71.09.020(8), (16) (West Supp. 2005).
274. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 71-901 to -962 (Cum. Supp. 2006).
275. See id. § 71-902 ("The purpose of the Nebraska Mental Health Commitment Act
is to provide for the treatment of persons who are mentally ill and dangerous.").
276. To refresh, the Kansas and Washington statutes define "mental abnormality" as
"a congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity
which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses in a degree con-
stituting such person a menace to the health and safety of others." KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 59-29a02(b) (2005); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(8) (West Supp.
2005). In Nebraska, the term "mental illness" is defined as "a psychiatric disor-
der that involves a severe or substantial impairment of a person's thought
processes, sensory input, mood balance, memory, or ability to reason which sub-
stantially interferes with such person's ability to meet the ordinary demands of
living or interferes with the safety or well-being of others." NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-
907 (Cum. Supp. 2006). See also L.B. 1199, § 87(3) (citing NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-
907 for definition of "mental illness").
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lence," which, according to the Nebraska act, means that "the person's
propensity to commit sex offenses resulting in serious harm to others
is of such a degree as to pose a menace to the health and safety of the
public."27 7 This definition is virtually identical to that appearing in
the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act,2 7 8 and similar language
appears in Washington's definition of the term "mental
abnormality. "279
Third, the Nebraska statute provides that if the alleged "dangerous
sex offender" suffers from a mental illness, he must have one or more
prior convictions for "sex offenses"; persons with personality disorders
must have at least two "sex offense[ ]" convictions. 28 0 For the pur-
poses of the Sex Offender Commitment Act, "[slex offense[s]" are de-
fined as "any of the offenses . . . for which registration as a sex
offender is required."2 8 ' Similarly, under the Washington and Kansas
statutes, sexual predator commitments can be imposed upon persons
who have been convicted of any one of several enumerated sex of-
fenses; however, in some instances, a person may be eligible for com-
mitment if he has merely been charged with one of these offenses.28 2
Fourth and finally, under the Nebraska act a dangerous sex of-
fender must be "[siubstantially unable to control his or her criminal
behavior," which means that the person has "serious difficulty in con-
trolling or resisting the desire or urge to commit sex offenses."28 3 This
element incorporates the Supreme Court's requirement, announced in
Crane, that "there must be proof of serious difficulty in controlling be-
havior" that distinguishes persons who may be civilly committed
"from the dangerous but typical recidivist."2 84
277. L.B. 1199, § 87(1)-(2).
278. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(c) (2005).
279. As noted above, the term mental abnormality is defined as "a congenital or ac-
quired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes
the person to the commission of criminal sexual acts in a degree constituting such
person a menace to the health and safety of others." WASH. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 71.09.020(8) (West Supp. 2005) (emphasis added).
280. L.B. 1199, § 87(1). Interestingly, neither Roger Einspahr nor Joseph Siems
would have been eligible for commitment under the Sex Offender Commitment
Act prior to their highly publicized attacks because "[n]either man had been con-
victed of a [sex offense]." Nate Jenkins & Nancy Hicks, Around the Rotunda:
Cases Unaffected by Sex Crimes Bills, LINCOLN J. STAR, Feb. 14, 2006, at 1B,
available at http://www.journalstar.com/articles/2006/02/14/local/doc43fl35d658
5ee379855932.txt.
281. L.B. 1199, § 87(5) (citing NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-4003 (listing the offenses covered
by the Nebraska Sex Offender Registration Act)).
282. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a), (e) (2005); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 71.09.020(15), (16) (West Supp. 2005).
283. L.B. 1199, § 87(6).
284. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002) (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S.
346, 357-58 (1997)).
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As the foregoing discussion illustrates, the Nebraska Sex Offender
Commitment Act differs from the Kansas and Washington sexually
violent predator laws in several respects. Many of these differences,
such as Nebraska's use of mental health board hearings and the clear-
and-convincing standard of proof in those hearings, may be attributed
to the Nebraska Legislature's decision to have the Sex Offender Com-
mitment Act parallel the state's standard commitment process, 285
which is set forth in the Nebraska Mental Health Commitment Act. 286
Despite these differences, however, it is clear that the Nebraska act
includes several provisions that have been adapted from the Washing-
ton and Kansas statutes and related court decisions. For the pur-
poses of this Article, the key similarity between Nebraska's new
commitment procedure and the Washington and Kansas procedures
lies in the statutes' authorization of civil commitments of persons
"who do not meet the traditional mentally ill and dangerous civil com-
mitment standard."28 7
The Sex Offender Commitment Act expands Nebraska's traditional
commitment criteria in two key respects. First, although it is true
that the Sex Offender Commitment Act incorporates the definition of
"mental illness" set forth in the Nebraska Mental Health Commit-
ment Act, 288 the Sex Offender Commitment Act also applies to per-
sons "diagnosed with a personality disorder."28 9 If, as some have
claimed, 40-60% of the male prison population can be diagnosed with
antisocial personality disorder, 290 the new act has the potential to
reach many persons who would not qualify for commitment under the
traditional "mental illness" criterion. 2 9 1 Second, the Sex Offender
285. JUDICIARY COMM., COMMITTEE STATEMENT: L.B. 1199, 99th Leg., 2d Sess., at 3
(Neb. 2006), available at http://srvwww.unicam.state.ne.us/unicamAllDraft-
ing.html (search "Search Drafting for" for "LB 1199" in the "99th - Committee
Statements" index; then follow link for "Microsoft Word - CS LB1199.doc").
286. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 71-901 to -962 (Cum. Supp. 2006).
287. JUDICIARY COMM., COMMITTEE STATEMENT: L.B. 1199, 99th Leg., 2d Sess., at 3
(Neb. 2006), available at http://srvwww.unicam.state.ne.us/unicamAllDraft-
ing.html (search "Search Drafting for" for "LB 1199" in the "99th - Committee
Statements" index; then follow link for "Microsoft Word - CS LB1199.doc"). See
also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (2005) (discussing how "sexually violent
predators" do not meet the requirements of the standard civil commitment proce-
dure); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010 (West 2002) (same).
288. See supra notes 274-76 and accompanying text.
289. L.B. 1199, 99th Leg., 2d Sess. § 87(4) (Neb. 2006).
290. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412 (2002) (citing P. Moran, The Epidemiology of
Antisocial Personality Disorder, 34 Soc. PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHIATRIC EPIDEMIOL-
OGY 231, 234 (1999)). Some estimate that seventy-five percent, or even ninety
percent, of prisoners could be diagnosed with this disorder. See Lisa Ells, Note,
Juvenile Psychopathy: The Hollow Promise of Prediction, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 158,
182 n.154 (2005).
291. Presumably, a personality disorder can satisfy Nebraska's "traditional" definition
of mental illness if it "involves a severe or substantial impairment of a person's
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Commitment Act significantly alters the traditional "dangerousness"
criterion. The Nebraska Mental Health Commitment Act provides for
the commitment of persons who, because of their mental illness, pre-
sent "[a] substantial risk of serious harm to another person or persons
within the near future as manifested by evidence of recent violent acts
or threats of violence or by placing others in reasonable fear of such
harm."2 92 Under the Sex Offender Commitment Act, no such evidence
is required-though presumably it would be relevant to establish the
"dangerous sex offender" commitment criterion.
These two modifications to the traditional commitment criteria al-
low the Sex Offender Commitment Act to serve the controversial func-
tion that the Washington and Kansas sexually violent predator
statutes were designed to perform-and that the United States Su-
preme Court, along with courts in Washington and Kansas, have
struggled to reconcile with the constitutional prohibitions against
double jeopardy and ex post facto punishment and principles of sub-
stantive due process. Specifically, the new Nebraska law, like the
Washington and Kansas statutes discussed above, facilitates the civil
commitment of convicted sex offenders nearing the completion of their
prison sentences who do not have the sort of psychological impairment
that would ordinarily subject them to commitment and who have not
committed recent acts that demonstrate their dangerousness. The
next Part of this Article attempts to explain why this controversial
type of civil commitment-which shall be referred to hereinafter as a
"convicted sex offender commitment"-has presented such difficulties
for the courts that have attempted to analyze its constitutionality. In
addition, it will be argued that these commitments distort the social
functions performed by criminal punishment and civil commitment in
the American legal system, and thereby unsettle the justifications for
civil and criminal deprivations of liberty.2 93
thought processes, sensory input, mood balance, memory, or ability to reason
which substantially interferes with such person's ability to meet the ordinary de-
mands of living or interferes with the safety or well-being of others." NEB. REV.
STAT. § 71-907 (Cum. Supp. 2006). Under the Sex Offender Commitment Act,
however, one is eligible for commitment merely by virtue of his personality disor-
der diagnosis, even if the disorder causes no "severe or substantial impair-
ments"-provided, of course, that the remaining commitment criteria are
satisfied. See L.B. 1199, § 87.
292. NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-908(1) (Cum. Supp. 2006) (emphasis added).
293. A number of points that this Article does not attempt to address merit mention.
First and foremost, this Article does not argue that Nebraska's Sex Offender
Commitment Act is or is not constitutional; nor does it argue that the Act is anal-
ogous to or distinguishable from the Washington and Kansas sexual predator
statutes in ways that affect the applicability of Hendricks, Crane, and other cases
to the Nebraska act.
In addition, the interplay between the Sex Offender Commitment Act and
other Nebraska statutes may raise interesting issues that, unfortunately, are be-
yond the scope of this Article. For example, if a person suffers from a mental
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IV. CONDEMNATION, CIVIL COMMITMENT, AND THE
EXPRESSIVE FUNCTION OF CONVICTED
SEX OFFENDER COMMITMENTS
The legal debate surrounding convicted sex offender commitments
focuses on two fundamental questions: First, are these commitments
truly civil, as opposed to criminal; and second, what sort of psychologi-
cal impairment must exist, in combination with dangerousness, to jus-
tify the State's infringement of an individual's liberty interest?29 4 The
fact that federal and state courts have arrived at different answers to
these questions suggests that clear answers are difficult to articulate
and defend. However, the answers to these questions are not only rel-
evant to the constitutionality of convicted sex offender commitment
schemes, but are also critical to a proper understanding of the interre-
lationship between the broader concepts of criminal responsibility and
psychological impairment. In other words, convicted sex offender com-
mitments are not merely controversial in terms of their constitutional-
ity-which, in and of itself, suggests that their place within the
fundamental legal structure governing our society is difficult to de-
fine-but they are also controversial insofar as they blur the concep-
tual lines that separate those persons who are justly held responsible
illness or personality disorder within the meaning of the Sex Offender Commit-
ment Act but also suffers from a developmental disability, it may not be clear
whether the person falls within the ambit of the Sex Offender Commitment Act
or the Developmental Disabilities Court-Ordered Custody Act, NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 71-1101 to -1134 (Cum. Supp. 2006). See also NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 83-1201 to
-1226 (Reissue 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2006) (addressing services to persons with
developmental disabilities). It should be noted, too, that Nebraska has a "sexu-
ally violent predator" statute apart from the Sex Offender Commitment Act.
When a person is convicted of an offense that requires him to register under the
Sex Offender Registration Act-which, as explained above, is a prerequisite for
commitment as a dangerous sex offender-the judge may, at sentencing, deter-
mine if the person is a "sexually violent predator." NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-
4005(3)(a) (Cum. Supp. 2006). "Sexually violent predator[s]" are defined as
persons
who [have] been convicted of one or more registrable offenses .. .and
who suffer[] from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that
makes the person likely to engage in sexually violent offenses directed at
a stranger, or at a person with whom a relationship has been established
or promoted, for the primary purpose of victimization.
Id. § 29-4005(4)(c). If the judge determines that the person is a sexually violent
predator, the person must register as a sex offender for the rest of his life and
verify that registration on a quarterly basis. Id. § 29-4005(3)(b). The similarities
between this definition of the term "sexually violent predator" and the criteria set
forth in the Washington, Kansas, and Nebraska sex offender commitment stat-
utes are clear. Less clear, however, is the weight, if any, that a Nebraska mental
health board will afford to a judge's "sexually violent predator" finding as it con-
ducts proceedings to determine whether the "sexually violent predator" must be
committed as a dangerous sex offender under the Sex Offender Commitment Act.
294. See supra Part II.
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for their violations of the law from those who are not responsible by
virtue of their psychological impairments.
This Part will describe the basic interrelationship between crimi-
nal responsibility and psychological impairment in the American legal
system and illustrate the manner in which convicted sex offender com-
mitments under the Washington, Kansas, and Nebraska statutes dis-
tort this interrelationship. First, the Supreme Court's test for
determining whether a commitment scheme is civil or criminal in na-
ture will be briefly restated. Next, an alternate analytical framework
based upon the concept of "condemnation" will be described. Condem-
nation will be thoroughly defined, and the role of condemnation within
the basic institutions of criminal punishment and civil commitment
will be outlined in order to illustrate the difference in the functions
that those institutions are intended to perform. Finally, convicted sex
offender commitments will be examined through the lens of condem-
nation, and it will be argued that these commitments distort the rela-
tionship between criminal responsibility and psychological
impairment in a manner that raises doubts about the "civil" nature of
these commitments.
A. The Ward Analysis and the Kennedy Factors: Deferring to
Legislative Intent Without an Operational Definition
of Punishment
As explained above, courts that have been tasked with determining
whether convicted sex offender commitments are civil or criminal in
nature have applied the two-part test described in United States v.
Ward.29 5 The test is highly deferential to the legislature: if it appears
that the legislature intended to establish a civil proceeding by, for in-
stance, placing the commitment statute in the state's civil code, a
court will ordinarily defer to the legislature's intent. 29 6 Indeed, the
court "will reject the legislature's manifest intent only where a party
challenging the statute provides 'the clearest proof that 'the statutory
scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the
State's] intention' to deem it 'civil."' 2 9 7 This "clearest proof' might be
based upon an argument that the statute promotes "the traditional
295. 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980). See, e.g., Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 261 (2001);
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997). Other tests that have been em-
ployed to determine whether various sex offender laws are civil or criminal are
outlined and criticized in Note, Prevention Versus Punishment: Toward a Princi-
pled Distinction in the Restraint of Released Sex Offenders, 109 HARv. L. REV.
1711, 1717-25 (1996). The note's author suggests that a principled classification
of sex offender statutes would be based first upon an evaluation of "the nature of
the disability imposed" by the statute, and second upon a determination "whether
the statute has retributive or general deterrent effects." Id. at 1726.
296. E.g., Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361.
297. Id. (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49 (1980)).
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aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence," or, perhaps, an ar-
gument that other factors set forth in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez
weigh in favor of a finding that the state's intention should be disre-
garded. 2 98 However, a court will not evaluate the nature of a statute
"by reference to the effect that [statute] has on a single individual." 299
Also, after a statute has been determined to be civil, individuals can-
not complete "an end run" around that determination by bringing an
"as-applied" challenge to the statute's civil nature. 300
This analytical framework allows courts to attempt to distinguish
between civil and criminal dispositions without deferring completely
to the legislature; however, it does so without articulating a basic defi-
nition of punishment.3 0 The following sections of this Article propose
that a defining characteristic of punishment-its expressive func-
tion-can help clarify the distinction between civil and criminal dispo-
sitions generally and illustrate the specific classification difficulties
presented by convicted sex offender commitment statutes.
B. Condemnation: The Expressive Function of Punishment
The distinction between civil sanctions and criminal punishment
has been explored extensively by scholars, yet remains elusive. 302 As
the foregoing section of this Article illustrated, courts consider the
functions performed by a particular deprivation of liberty in order to
determine whether that deprivation is truly civil or criminal in na-
ture:3 03 If a deprivation of liberty serves retributive or deterrent func-
tions, it may be deemed criminal.304 On the other hand, if it performs
different functions-such as "restrict[ing] the freedom of the danger-
ously mentally ill" in order to protect the public-a deprivation of lib-
erty may be deemed civil.30 5
298. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963). See also Hendricks,
521 U.S. at 362 (explaining that the presence or lack of a scienter requirement
may be one factor courts look at in determining if a statute is civil or criminal
(citing Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168)); Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 751-52
(W.D. Wash. 1995) (same); In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 997-98 (Wash. 1993)
(same).
299. Seling, 531 U.S. at 262.
300. Id. at 263.
301. See Stephen R. McAllister, "Punishing" Sex Offenders, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 27,
56-57 (1997).
302.. See Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in PHILOSOPHY OF
LAw 592, 592-93 (Joel Feinberg & Hyman Gross eds., 5th ed. 1995).
303. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 ("[W]here Congress has indicated an
intention to establish a civil penalty, we have inquired further whether the statu-
tory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate that inten-
tion." (emphasis added)).
304. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361-62 (1997); United States v.
Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989).
305. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 363.
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In addition to retributive and deterrent functions, criminal punish-
ment also serves an expressive function; that is, it has a special "sym-
bolic significance. "306 Specifically, it has been argued that
"[plunishment is a conventional device for the expression of attitudes
of resentment and indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and
reprobation, either on the part of the punishing authority himself or of
those 'in whose name' the punishment is inflicted."307 This "fusing of
resentment and reprobation," where "resentment" refers to "vengeful
attitudes" and "reprobation" to disapproving judgment distinct from
the emotionally rooted resentment, has been labeled "condemna-
tion."308 Punishment ordinarily expresses condemnation, while civil
sanctions do not.30 9
The relationship among the concepts of condemnation, retribution,
and revenge is subtle; indeed, an alternate definition of condemnation
can be developed from a careful examination of the concepts of re-
venge and retribution. Retribution is arguably distinguishable from
revenge in part because retribution occurs only in response to wrongs,
whereas revenge may be undertaken in response to a harm which
might not be a wrong.3 10 Retribution is also distinguishable in that
the extent of a retributive response to a wrong is limited by the seri-
ousness of the wrong, while the limits of revenge are not intrinsically
bounded.311 In other words, a retributive response is proportional to
the wrong, while a revenger indulges the limits of his preferences as
he responds to a harm against him. A third basis for distinguishing
retribution from revenge might be based upon the notion of a special
attachment between a revenger and the victim of a harm. Arguably,
revenge requires a special, possibly personal connection to the victim
of a harm, while retribution may be carried out by an agent who has
no special tie to the victim. 3 12 These three bases for distinguishing
revenge and retribution are not intended to be exhaustive, but merely
illustrative.313 For present purposes, it is sufficient that a retributive
306. Feinberg, supra note 302, at 593.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 594.
309. Id. at 593.
310. Robert Nozick, Retribution and Revenge, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 302,
at 675. A brief hypothetical helps illustrate the difference between a "harm" and
a "wrong" as those terms relate to the concepts of revenge and retribution. Con-
sider an organized crime leader, or "boss," who decides to hurt an individual for
testifying against the boss at trial. The crime boss can be said to be seeking re-
venge because he was harmed by the witness's testimony. However, since the act
of testifying is not a wrong, he cannot be said to be seeking retribution in its
technical sense.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. It has also been argued that revenge is characterized by "a particular emotional
tone" that need not be present with retribution and that a revenger is not com-
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response to an act may be defined as one that is triggered by a wrong,
is proportional to that wrong, and may or may not involve a special tie
to the person affected by the wrong. In contrast, a vengeful response
to an act is triggered by a harm which may or may not be a wrong,
need not be limited by notions of proportionality, and involves a spe-
cial tie to the person affected by the act.
Note that it is possible for a response to qualify as both retribution
and revenge if the response is proportional to a wrong and involves a
special tie to the affected person, and recall that condemnation has
been said to consist of a "fusing of resentment and reprobation."31 4 If,
as noted above, "resentment" is the emotional force that motivates re-
venge, 3 15 and "reprobation" is the "disapproving judgment" that limits
vengeful passions and legitimates retributive responses,316 condem-
nation amounts to an expression of "retributive revenge," which con-
sists of those responses which qualify as both retribution and revenge.
Since criminal punishment generally expresses condemnation, the
foregoing analysis suggests that criminal punishment can express a
certain vengefulness, but only to the extent that this vengefulness is
consistent with, or bounded by, retribution.
In sum, criminal punishment can be distinguished from civil depri-
vations of liberty or property by its expressive function; that is, crimi-
nal punishment serves as the conventional means of expressing
attitudes of resentment fused with rational, disapproving judgment on
behalf of the State or its citizens. This fusion of attitudes and judg-
ments, which has the characteristics of "retributive revenge," is
termed "condemnation."
To the extent that condemnation can be used to distinguish civil
deprivations of liberty from criminal punishment, it might be used as
an alternative or supplement to the analysis that courts traditionally
undertake when tasked with drawing such a distinction. The sections
that follow describe the manner in which condemnation is expressed
through the American criminal justice system and illustrate that civil
commitments are not intended to express condemnation toward com-
mitted persons, even when those persons violate criminal laws. It is
argued that the expressive function of punishment does indeed distin-
guish criminal convictions from ordinary civil commitments, and that
its ability to do so lies in the relationship between condemnation and
the capacity for criminal responsibility.
mitted to seeking revenge in every instance, whereas those who act in retribution
must be committed to imposing similar punishments across similar circum-
stances. Id. at 676.
314. Feinberg, supra note 302, at 594.
315. Id.
316. Id.
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C. Condemnation and the Capacity for Criminal
Responsibility 3 17
A traditional requirement for the imposition of punishment is ac-
countability, or the psychological capacity required for criminal re-
sponsibility.31s It follows, therefore, that however society deems to
treat persons who violate its criminal laws while lacking this capacity,
that treatment should not amount to punishment. In view of this fact,
if condemnation is to serve as a useful basis for analyzing the distinc-
tion between civil and criminal dispositions, the relationship between
condemnation and the capacity for criminal responsibility must be
closely examined. A description of the various senses in which con-
demnation is expressed by the American criminal justice system will
help to clarify this relationship. 3 19
For the purposes of this Article, it is necessary to analyze four
types of condemnation that, it has been argued, are expressed by the
criminal justice system. 3 20 First, condemnation is expressed when a
social institution proscribes a certain category of conduct. 32 1 This
commonly occurs when a legislature defines a particular crime and
sets its punishment. 32 2 For example, if a legislature criminalizes "for-
nication,"323 a degree of condemnation is thereby expressed toward
the category of conduct that satisfies the statute's definition of fornica-
tion. This sort of condemnation will be referred to hereinafter as con-
demnation type one.
317. As used here, the notion of "capacity for criminal responsibility" is intended to
refer to the psychological capacities relevant to the determination that an actor
was "competent" to commit a crime. See Robert F. Schopp, Civil Commitment
and Sexual Predators: Competence and Condemnation, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y &
L. 323, 355 (1998). In jurisdictions with an insanity defense, these capacities
would be evaluated using the standard set forth in the insanity-defense statute.
In other jurisdictions, these capacities would be evaluated against the concept of
mens rea. See, e.g., State v. McDougall, 749 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Idaho Ct. App.
1988) ("Although eliminating affirmative defenses based upon the defendant's
mental condition, the statute does not relieve the state of its burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged.
In every crime or public offense there still must exist either a union of act and
intent, or criminal negligence." (citations omitted)).
318. See, e.g., Peter Arenella, Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the Rela-
tionship Between Legal and Moral Accountability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1511,
1521-24 (1992); RICHARD G. SINGER & MARTIN R. GARDNER, CRIMES AND PUNISH-
MENT: CASES, MATERIALS AND READINGS IN CRIMINAL LAW 854-64 (1989).
319. See Robert F. Schopp, Justification Defenses and Just Convictions, 24 PAC. L. J.
1233, 1258-62 (1993).
320. Id. at 1258-61.
321. Id. at 1259-60.
322. See id. at 1261.
323. See Traci Shallbetter Stratton, No More Messing Around: Substantive Due Pro-
cess Challenges to State Laws Prohibiting Fornication, 73 WASH. L. REV. 767, 767
n.1, 769-70 (1998) (reporting that fornication, or the act of sexual intercourse
between unmarried partners, was prohibited in all but ten states in 1965).
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Condemnation type two accompanies an affirmation of an institu-
tional proscription.3 24 Such an affirmation typically occurs when an
institutional proscription is enforced. For example, if "fornication" has
been criminalized, but the state's fornication statute is not enforced by
the police, there has been an expression of condemnation of type one,
but not type two, towards the category of conduct labeled
"fornication."3 25
Condemnation type three is expressed when the proscription of a
particular institutionally proscribed act is affirmed upon the consider-
ation of the specific circumstances of its commission. 3 26 This type of
condemnation is fact-specific and indicates that the commission of a
proscribed act was not justified in a particular instance.3 2 7 For exam-
ple, if a state has criminalized conduct defined as "the intentional kill-
ing of another person," and if this prohibition is enforced, then the
category of conduct defined as "the intentional killing of another per-
son" is the subject of condemnation types one and two. If, however,
the intentional killing in a particular case were determined to have
been justified-perhaps because it occurred as a result of self de-
fense-condemnation type three would not be expressed toward this
specific act of intentional killing.
Finally, condemnation type four is expressed toward a fully ac-
countable agent who has committed an institutionally proscribed
act.3 28 To illustrate, suppose that conduct defined as "the intentional
killing of another person" is institutionally proscribed and that this
institutional proscription is enforced when intentional killings occur.
Suppose further that an intentional killing of another person has oc-
curred, and that it was not justified. Thus, condemnation of types one,
two, and three are expressed toward the killing. Condemnation of
type four will be expressed toward the person who committed the in-
tentional killing if it is determined that this person was a fully ac-
countable actor at the time of the killing. If, however, it is found that
the person lacked accountability for the act-say, for example, due to
a psychological impairment that rendered him legally insane-then
condemnation type four would not be expressed toward him. It should
be noted that condemnation types one through three are expressed
toward a category of behavior or a specific act that falls within that
324. Schopp, supra note 319, at 1260, 1262-63.
325. Id. at 1262-63.
326. Id. at 1260.
327. See id.
328. Id. at 1260-61. Schopp has identified a fifth type of condemnation, which is
based on the moral blameworthiness of the actor. Id. at 1261-62. This type of
condemnation is not directly relevant to the present analysis, and therefore it is
not discussed in this Article.
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category, but the fourth type extends condemnation to the actor as a
fully accountable moral agent.32 9
When a person commits a criminally proscribed act and is appre-
hended by the authorities, charged, tried, convicted, and sentenced,
condemnation of types one through four will be expressed.330 At mini-
mum, however, whenever punishment is imposed under the American
criminal justice system, condemnation types one and four are ex-
pressed:3 3 1 The principle of legality 332 results in an expression of con-
demnation type one in all cases where punishment is imposed, 33 3 and
condemnation type four inheres in criminal punishment because, as is
the case in any minimally retributive criminal justice system, 33 4 a de-
termination of "accountability by systemic standards [is] a necessary
condition for conviction and punishment."33 5
In sum, it has been argued that condemnation is expressed by the
criminal justice system generally and by the system's application in
specific cases. However, the system imposes punishment upon, and
expresses condemnation toward, only those persons who are found to
have performed institutionally proscribed acts while acting as crimi-
nally responsible, accountable actors. As will be explained below, a
separate and, in some ways, complimentary institution may subject
329. See id. at 1261-62.
330. See id. at 1264.
331. Id. at 1263-64. Condemnation types two and three are not necessarily expressed
in every case when criminal punishment is imposed. Note that condemnation of
type two would not be expressed in a case where the criminal code diverges from
conventional notions of morality such that jurors do not wish to affirm the insti-
tutional proscription of the prohibited act, but nevertheless convict the defendant
based upon their acceptance of their duty to apply the law as instructed. Id. at
1262-64. Similarly, condemnation of type three would not be expressed in a case
where jurors affirm the systemic condemnation of an act generally, "deny that
this particular instance of that type [of act] merits condemnation," but neverthe-
less convict the defendant to satisfy their oath to apply the law. Id. at 1262.
332. A discussion of the principle of legality, which is based on the notion that there be
no punishment without law, may be found in SINGER & GARDNER, supra note 318,
at 169-90.
333. See Schopp, supra note 319, at 1263 ("[Tlhe first type, involving condemnation at
the institutional level of the general category of conduct, inheres in any institu-
tion of criminal punishment because the criminal justice system represents the
official conventional social morality for the society in which it is embedded.").
334. Here, "minimally retributive" is meant to suggest a system wherein a conviction
and punishment must be conditioned "on retributive requirements of guilt, culpa-
bility, responsibility, or desert." Id. See also Schopp, supra note 317, at 336-37
(noting that minimally retributive criminal justice systems, such as that of the
United States, "limit criminal responsibility to those who deserve punishment by
virtue of violating an offense definition while meeting systemic criteria of culpa-
bility"). In contrast, in a purely utilitarian system of criminal justice, it would be
possible to convict and punish a person who was not responsible for a given crimi-
nal act, if doing so would maximize the overall benefits to society.
335. Schopp, supra note 319, at 1263-64. See also supra note 317 (discussing the idea
of "capacity for criminal responsibility").
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persons who lack criminal accountability to nonpunitive deprivations
of liberty.
D. Condemnation and Ordinary Police Power Civil
Commitments
The state exercises its police power, or its "authority to wield coer-
cive force in order to protect the community from harm,"3 36 when it
punishes criminals. It may also exercise this power when it civilly
commits persons who suffer from psychological impairments that
render them dangerous. 3 3 7 Since criminal and civil deprivations of
liberty can both be based upon a state's police powers, it follows that
there is some overlap in the functions that these deprivations of lib-
erty perform. For example, criminal sentences and civil commitments
may each legitimately serve the function of incapacitation.338 Never-
theless, this overlap is certainly not complete; indeed, the Supreme
Court has suggested that if a civil deprivation of liberty performs re-
tributive and deterrent functions, it ought to be considered criminal in
nature.3 3 9 However, the Court has not clearly articulated the reasons
why civil commitments cannot serve retributive and deterrent pur-
poses. This section presents an argument that the condemnation
framework set forth above can, when considered along with the tradi-
tional justifications for police power civil commitments, illustrate
these reasons.
The criminal justice system, which is administered by a state pur-
suant to its police power, serves "as the primary legal institution of
coercive social control over adult citizens who engage in culpable con-
duct that harms the legitimate interests of others."340 In other words,
the criminal justice system, with its associated rights and rules, is, at
336. Schopp, supra note 317, at 332; ROBERT F. SCHOPP, COMPETENCE, CONDEMNATION,
AND COMMITMENT 17 (2001).
337. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 372 (1997) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("As all
Members of the Court seem to agree, then, the power of the State to confine per-
sons who, by reason of a mental disease or mental abnormality, constitute a real,
continuing, and serious danger to society is well established." (citing Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426-27 (1979))); Schopp, supra note 317, at 332-33. Civil
commitments may also be based upon a state's parens patriae power, which al-
lows the state to exert authority over citizens who lack the capacity to care for
themselves. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 426; Schopp, supra note 317, at 332-33.
The specific uses of these commitments and their legal contours are not relevant
to the analysis presented here, and in this Article the term "civil commitment"
should be understood to refer to civil commitments based upon a state's police
power.
338. See, e.g., Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 373 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
339. See id. at 361-62 (majority opinion); id. at 373 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
('[R]etribution and general deterrence are reserved for the criminal system
alone.").
340. SCHOPP, supra note 336, at 17.
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least in the United States (and other countries that respect the stand-
ing of accountable agents), the conventional institution for imposing
legal punishment. 3 4 1 As explained in the previous section of this Arti-
cle, when criminal punishment is imposed there will typically be an
institutional proscription of a category of conduct, an affirmation of
that general proscription, a determination that a particular act that
falls within that category is not justified, and a determination that the
person who committed the particular act is a criminally responsible
actor. 342 The criminal justice system is designed to identify pro-
scribed conduct and provide an institutional framework for the deter-
minations that ordinarily precede the imposition of punishment. That
is, the criminal code publishes the institutional proscriptions; the po-
lice force, prosecutors, judges, and jurors determine whether to affirm
the general proscriptions; and, in criminal trials, judges or jurors de-
termine whether the proscription of a particular act should be af-
firmed in the specific case before them and whether the actor
committed the act as a responsible agent. Criminal punishment may
follow when each of these steps has been satisfied; before punishment
may be imposed, however, there must at least be an institutional pro-
scription of a category of conduct and an institutional determination
that a person committed an act that falls within that category while
acting as an accountable moral agent. 343 This punishment, in turn,
can serve retributive, deterrent, and special expressive functions. It
follows that, conversely, without a determination that the accused is
an accountable agent, criminal punishment cannot follow, no retribu-
tive or deterrent 3 44 goals would be served if he were otherwise institu-
341. See Schopp, supra note 319, at 1259.
342. See supra section V.C.
343. See supra section N.C.
344. This is not to say that people who lack the capacity to act as accountable agents
cannot be "deterred" in any sense of the term. Indeed, it might be said that
trained animals are "deterred" from performing forbidden acts. Yet the Supreme
Court has stated specifically that commitment under the Kansas Sexually Vio-
lent Predator Act "does not implicate ... deterrence." Hendricks, 521 U.S. at
361-62. See also id. at 373 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("We should bear in mind
that while incapacitation is a goal common to both the criminal and civil systems
of confinement, retribution and general deterrence are reserved for the criminal
system alone."). It is doubtful that the Court means to suggest that persons can-
not be civilly committed if they can be deterred in the same sense as a trained
animal, or that this sort of deterrence is "reserved for the criminal system alone."
For the purposes of this Article-and, arguably, for the Supreme Court's analysis
in Hendricks-"deterrence" refers to something more than a mere conditioned
response, and its functioning depends upon the actor's capacity for criminal re-
sponsibility. More specifically, "deterrence" (as the term is used here) is a goal
served only by the criminal justice system because it is reserved for those people
who have the capability of refraining from criminal conduct through the exercise
of the psychological capacities relevant to criminal responsibility.
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tionally incapacitated, and no condemnation would be expressed
toward him by such an incapacitation.
Civil commitments may also be based upon a state's police powers,
and, as will be explained below, they may be imposed through the
criminal justice system. Typically, however, civil commitments are
imposed via the operation of institutions separate and distinct from
the criminal justice system. These civil commitment institutions,
which vary in their particulars from state to state, may differ from the
criminal justice system in several key respects. Certain rights that
must be afforded in criminal proceedings are not implicated when civil
commitments stem from a state's conventional civil commitment insti-
tution, 34 5 and institutions of civil commitment may employ different
rules and procedures than those required in criminal proceedings. For
example, civil commitments under Nebraska's Mental Health Com-
mitment Act are based upon "clear and convincing" evidence, as op-
posed to a standard of proof "beyond a reasonable doubt," and the
commitment decision is made by a mental health board, as opposed to
a jury.3 46 These differences between criminal proceedings and civil
commitment proceedings are not problematic because states' civil
commitment statutes are neither designed nor intended to result in
the imposition of criminal punishment. 3 47 Instead, their purpose "is
to treat [an] individual's mental illness and protect him and society
from his potential dangerousness." 348 To achieve this purpose while
protecting individuals' core substantive due process interests in free-
dom from bodily restraint, civil commitments imposed under a state's
ordinary civil commitment statutes are generally held to be constitu-
tionally valid when there has been an institutional determination-
based upon at least clear and convincing evidence-that a person suf-
fers from a particular type of psychological impairment that renders
him dangerous. 34 9 In Nebraska, the requisite psychological impair-
345. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980) ("The Self-Incrimination Clause
of the Fifth Amendment, for example, is expressly limited to 'any criminal case.'
Similarly, the protections provided by the Sixth Amendment are available only in
'criminal prosecutions.' Other constitutional protections, while not explicitly lim-
ited to one context or the other, have been so limited by decision of this Court.
See, e.g., Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391,399 (1938) (Double Jeopardy Clause
protects only against two criminal punishments); United States v. Regan 232
U.S. 37, 47-48 (1914) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt required only in criminal
cases).").
346. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-925 (Cum. Supp. 2006).
347. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428 (1979).
348. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983).
349. See, e.g., Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 409-10 (2002) ("'We have consistently
upheld such involuntary commitment statutes' when (1) 'the confinement takes
place pursuant to proper procedures and evidentiary standards,' (2) there is a
finding of 'dangerousness either to one's self or to others,' and (3) proof of danger-
ousness is 'coupled... with the proof of some additional factor, such as a "mental
illness" or "mental abnormality."'" (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346,
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ment is defined as "a psychiatric disorder that involves a severe or
substantial impairment of a person's thought processes, sensory in-
put, mood balance, memory, or ability to reason which substantially
interferes with such person's ability to meet the ordinary demands of
living or interferes with the safety or well-being of others," and dan-
gerousness is demonstrated when a person, because of this disorder,
presents "[a] substantial risk of serious harm to another person or per-
sons within the near future."350 If these criteria are satisfied and a
civil commitment is ordered, it may be said that the commitment
bears a "reasonable relation" to the goals of treating psychological im-
pairments while protecting society from danger. 3 5 1 In other words,
the involuntary civil commitment is justified by the presence of a qual-
ifying psychological impairment and evidence of dangerousness attrib-
utable to that impairment. However, if either criterion ceases to be
satisfied, the justification for the commitment dissolves and the per-
son can no longer be held involuntarily.3 52
Note that the justification for civil commitments does not depend
upon the commission of an institutionally proscribed act by an ac-
countable agent. In the language of the condemnation framework out-
lined above, it might be said that unlike criminal punishment, civil
commitments may occur in the absence of condemnation types one
and four. This is consistent with civil commitment's nonpunitive in-
stitutional purpose of protecting the public from the dangerous men-
tally ill; indeed, it suggests that civil commitments are not punitive,
and, therefore, they do not, and cannot, promote the goals of retribu-
tion and deterrence.
Although civil commitments do not depend upon the commission of
institutionally proscribed acts, it does not follow that civil commit-
ments cannot occur when the subject of the commitment has commit-
ted an institutionally proscribed act. On the contrary, civil
commitments based on determinations that defendants are incompe-
tent to proceed or legally insane may flow directly from the criminal
justice system; that is, they may be imposed at the conclusion of crimi-
nal proceedings as opposed to proceedings under the standard civil
357-58 (1997))); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992). But see Schopp,
supra note 317, at 328-30 (arguing that the cases relied upon by the Court in
Foucha fail to establish that civil commitments require mental illness and
dangerousness).
350. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 71-907, 71-908(1) (Cum. Supp. 2006). See also id. § 71-902
("The purpose of the Nebraska Mental Health Commitment Act is to provide for
the treatment of persons who are mentally ill and dangerous.").
351. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 79. Indeed, "[d]ue process requires that the nature of com-
mitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is
committed." Id. (citing Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983); Jackson
v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972)).
352. Id. at 77-79.
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commitment statute.3 53 Although these commitments have been held
to be consistent with the "reasonable relationship" principle and,
therefore, are consistent with principles of due process, 3 5 4 their civil
nature is also illustrated effectively by the four-level condemnation
framework.
Suppose that a person commits an institutionally proscribed act-
say, a sexual assault-but it is determined that the person lacks com-
petence to proceed to trial. Suppose too that as a direct result of his
incompetence to proceed, he is civilly committed. 35 5 If one were to
question whether this commitment is truly civil, as opposed to crimi-
nal, in nature, one might focus upon the function performed by the
commitment and determine that it is indeed "civil." 3 56 Alternately,
one might apply the condemnation framework and determine that, in
fact, the commitment must be civil in nature. In this example, an ex-
pression of condemnation type one is associated with the proscription
of the relevant category of conduct (i.e., sexual assaults in general),
and it might be assumed that, based upon the affirmation of the insti-
tutional proscription of sexual assaults reflected in the decision to
prosecute the alleged offender, there has been an expression of con-
demnation type two. However, owing to the defendant's incompetence
to proceed in the criminal justice system, the defendant's particular
sexual assault cannot be evaluated by the criminal justice system to
determine whether it merits condemnation (of type three); nor can
there be a determination that the defendant committed his sexual as-
sault as an accountable agent, which is a prerequisite for an expres-
sion of condemnation (type four) towards the actor himself. In sum,
even though the defendant may have committed an institutionally
proscribed act, and even though his commitment was imposed under
the criminal justice system (as opposed to the state's ordinary civil
commitment institutions), the defendant's commitment cannot ex-
353. See Jones, 463 U.S. at 366; Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738.
354. Jones, 463 U.S. at 366; Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738.
355. The Supreme Court has held that the state may civilly commit a person based
solely on his incompetence to proceed, although the duration of the commitment
is limited to "the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there
is a substantial probability that [the person] will attain [the] capacity [to proceed]
in the foreseeable future." Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738. If it is found that there is no
substantial probability that the person will attain that capacity in the foreseeable
future, the person's confinement can continue only if he is committed pursuant to
"the customary civil commitment" statute. Id. On the other hand, if it is deter-
mined that the person soon may be able to proceed to trial, "his continued com-
mitment must be justified by progress toward that goal." Id. See also NEB. REV.
STAT. § 29-1823(1) (Cum. Supp. 2006) ("Should the district judge determine after
a hearing that the accused is mentally incompetent to stand trial and that there
is a substantial probability that the accused will become competent within the
foreseeable future, the district judge shall order the accused to be committed ...
until such time as the disability may be removed.").
356. See Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738.
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press condemnation-nor can it be deemed criminal or punitive in na-
ture-because there has been no determination that the individual
committed an act of an institutionally proscribed type while acting as
an accountable agent.
Similarly, suppose that a person commits a sexual assault, but he
successfully raises an insanity defense during his criminal prosecu-
tion. Thereafter, based solely upon the defendant's legal insanity, the
state civilly commits him. 35 7 In this case, as in the case described
immediately above, there has been an expression of condemnation
type one and, it may be assumed, an expression of condemnation type
two toward the category of conduct defined as "sexual assault." In ad-
dition, given the affirmative nature of the insanity defense, it is argu-
able that an insanity acquittal results in at least an implicit
determination that the specific sexual assault committed by the defen-
dant merits condemnation (of type three).358 Thus, there may be an
expression of condemnation types one, two, and three. Nevertheless,
the post-insanity acquittal commitment does not express condemna-
tion toward the defendant because it is not based upon a determina-
tion that the defendant committed the proscribed act while acting as
357. See Jones, 463 U.S. at 366, 370. In Nebraska, however, insanity acquittals do not
automatically result in civil commitments:
Nebraska statutes provide for special procedures in the case of per-
sons acquitted of a crime on grounds of insanity. When an individual is
acquitted on these grounds, a hearing is held to determine "whether
there is probable cause to believe the person is dangerous to himself,
herself, or others by reason of mental illness or defect, or will be so dan-
gerous in the foreseeable future, as demonstrated by an overt act or
threat." § 29-3701(1). If the court finds probable cause, the individual
may be committed to a regional center or other facility for up to a 90-day
evaluation period, during which a treatment plan is developed. The
court shall specify all conditions of the individual's confinement during
this period.
Before the end of the evaluation period, the court shall conduct an
evidentiary hearing regarding the person's condition, and if the evidence
is clear and convincing that the person is dangerous, the court shall com-
mit the person for treatment to one of the regional centers or other ap-
propriate facility. § 29-3702. The statute calls for an annual review by
the original trial court of the individual's status, and if it is found that
the individual is no longer dangerous, the court shall order the individ-
ual unconditionally released. § 29-3703. If continued dangerousness is
found, the person may be returned for further treatment and may be
placed in a less restrictive setting if that placement is consistent with
public safety. § 29-3703(2). The individual is entitled to counsel and
other constitutional rights for each hearing conducted under the statute.
§ 29-3704.
Tulloch v. State, 237 Neb. 138, 140-41, 465 N.W.2d 448, 451 (1991).
358. "A verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity establishes two facts: (i) the defen-
dant committed an act that constitutes a criminal offense, and (ii) he committed
the act because of mental illness." Jones, 463 U.S. at 363 (emphasis added).
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an accountable agent.3 59 Indeed, the successful insanity defense pre-
cluded a determination that condemnation of type four is appropri-
ately expressed toward the individual, even though the proscription of
the defendant's specific act may have been affirmed during the crimi-
nal proceedings.
Note also that a person may be convicted of a crime and, after he
has fully served a prison sentence, civilly committed-provided that
the civil commitment criteria are satisfied. 36 0 For example, a person
who has been convicted of a sexual assault may, during his prison sen-
tence, develop a psychological impairment that satisfies the "mental
illness" prong of a state's civil commitment statute and renders him
dangerous within the meaning of the statute. If he is then civilly com-
mitted upon the expiration of his sentence, it does not follow that his
civil commitment expresses condemnation toward him-even though
the criminal justice system has determined that the person is an ap-
propriate subject of condemnation. This is so because the post-sen-
tence commitment is based upon the statutory commitment criteria,
not upon the fact that the defendant was found to be criminally re-
sponsible for a sexual assault. If, however, the standard commitment
criteria are not satisfied, and the person is nevertheless civilly com-
mitted upon the completion of his criminal sentence, his commitment
would be subject to challenge on the ground that there is no reasona-
ble basis for treating him differently from persons who are civilly com-
mitted under the standard statute.3 6 1
In sum, although civil commitments may be based upon a state's
police power, they are not designed to impose punishment, and there-
fore they do not serve retributive or deterrent functions. Instead,
states' civil commitment statutes establish institutions that are de-
signed to confine persons with statutorily defined psychological im-
pairments that render them dangerous. Principles of due process
"require I that the nature and duration of [a] commitment bear some
359. Instead, the commitment is based upon "the purposes of treatment and the pro-
tection of society," id. at 366, as are ordinary civil commitments, id. at 368.
360. See, e.g., Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 110-12 (1966). In Baxstrom, the
Court held that persons may not be civilly committed at the expiration of their
criminal sentences "without the jury review available to all other persons civilly
committed in New York." Id. at 110. The Court rejected the argument that the
State "created a reasonable classification differentiating the civilly insane from
the 'criminally insane'" that would justify differential treatment for persons near-
ing the end of prison sentences, stating,
Classification of mentally ill persons as either insane or dangerously in-
sane of course may be a reasonable distinction for purposes of determin-
ing the type of custodial or medical care to be given, but it has no
relevance whatever in the context of the opportunity to show whether a
person is mentally ill at all.
Id. at 111.
361. See id. at 110-12.
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reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is commit-
ted,"362 and these principles may be satisfied in cases where individu-
als are committed following determinations that they are incompetent
to proceed to trial or are not guilty by reason of insanity, even if pro-
ceedings under the standard civil commitment statute do not occur.
The condemnation framework outlined above illustrates that civil
commitments do not express condemnation-and are not punitive-
even when civil commitments flow directly from criminal proceedings.
The relationship between condemnation, criminal punishment,
and civil commitment described above is not meant to account for all
of the intimate workings of the entire criminal justice system, let
alone all of the particular variations in states' civil commitment stat-
utes.3 63 However, it is consistent with the basic institutions of crimi-
nal punishment and civil commitment in the United States. It will be
argued next that convicted sex offender commitments distort the con-
ventional functions of these institutions due to the ambiguous expres-
sive function that they perform.
E. The Expressive Function of Convicted Sex Offender
Commitments
Courts' differing views about the functions performed by convicted
sex offender commitments were summarized above in Part II. To re-
fresh, the United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington found that these commitments "promote the traditional
aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence,"364 while the Wash-
ington Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court reached
the opposite conclusion.3 6 5 The courts also disagreed whether the
commitment criteria satisfied substantive due process require-
ments.3 66 The Nebraska Sex Offender Commitment Act appears to
raise the same controversial questions about the civil nature of con-
victed sex offender commitments and the substantive due process
362. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
363. For a much more thorough study of this relationship, generally see SCHOPP, supra
note 336; and Schopp, supra note 317.
364. Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 752 (W.D. Wash. 1995). See also In re Hen-
dricks, 912 P.2d 129, 136 (Kan. 1996) (finding the Kansas act's primary purpose
was "to continue incarceration and not to provide treatment").
365. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361-62 (1997); In re Young, 857 P.2d 989,
998-99 (Wash. 1993).
366. Compare Young, 898 F. Supp. at 748-51 (concluding that the statutes' commit-
ment criteria violate substantive due process rights because they allow for "the
indefinite confinement of persons who are not mentally ill"), and In re Hendricks,
912 P.2d at 136-38 (indefinite confinement of person who is not mentally ill vio-
lates the Constitution), with Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 356-58, and In re Young, 857
P.2d at 998-1009 (finding that "the Statute does not violate substantive due pro-
cess" because it "conditions civil commitment on a finding of both a mental disor-
der and dangerousness").
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rights of committed persons. 3 67 This section presents the argument
that an analysis of the expressive function of convicted sex offender
commitments 3 68 using the four-level condemnation framework can
help to explain why courts reach opposite conclusions on each of these
issues. In addition, the condemnation framework illustrates that the
two main issues of contention are not as independent as the courts'
analyses might suggest. It is further argued that an analysis of the
expressive function of convicted sex offender commitments reveals
that these commitments distort the functions that are ordinarily per-
formed by the institution of civil commitment by blurring them with
the traditional functions of the criminal justice system, while simulta-
neously diluting the expression of condemnation that inheres in crimi-
nal punishment.
Recall that an institutional disposition amounts to punishment if it
is based upon a determination that an institutionally proscribed act
has been committed by a criminally responsible actor.3 6 9 Recall also
that the institutional proscription of a category of conduct and the in-
stitutional determination that the actor was criminally responsible
when he committed the act express condemnation of types one and
four, respectively. Assume that a man named Andy has been con-
victed of the offense of rape and has been sentenced to serve a prison
term. Since there has been an expression of condemnation type one
(by virtue of the institutional proscription of rape as a category of con-
duct) and type four (by virtue of the determination that Andy was
criminally responsible for his violation of the institutional proscrip-
tion), it follows that Andy's sentence is punishment.
If Andy is subjected to a convicted sex offender commitment at the
conclusion of his sentence, note that, unless the offense of rape has
been deleted from the criminal code, there continues to be an expres-
sion of condemnation type one toward "rape" as a category of conduct.
Therefore, if Andy's sex offender commitment is based on a determina-
tion that he acted as a criminally responsible agent when he violated
that institutional proscription, the commitment expresses condemna-
tion type four, and therefore the commitment performs the expressive
function of punishment.
One might argue that Andy's sex offender commitment does not
depend upon a determination that he was criminally responsible for
367. See supra Part III.
368. Recall that in this Article, the term "convicted sex offender commitments" is re-
served for the most controversial of commitments under the Washington, Kansas,
and Nebraska sex offender commitment statutes, i.e., commitments of convicted
sex offenders nearing the completion of their prison sentences who do not have
the sort of psychological impairment that would ordinarily subject them to civil
commitment and who have not committed recent acts that demonstrate their
dangerousness.
369. See supra section IV.C.
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violating an institutional proscription, but depends instead upon evi-
dence that he has a psychological impairment that makes him likely
to commit sex offenses and seriously affects his ability to control his
behavior. Indeed, this seems to be the premise underlying convicted
sex offender commitments generally. However, this argument is prob-
lematic for two main reasons: there are equal protection implications
that have yet to be addressed by the Supreme Court, and the nature of
the psychological impairment that could justify this commitment
without undermining the justification for Andy's prior conviction is
mysterious. Each of these problems will be discussed below in turn.
First, it is true that civil commitments may follow on the heels of
criminal sentences without substantial controversy, provided that the
standard civil commitment criteria are satisfied.370 However, con-
victed sex offender commitments are controversial precisely because
they permit civil commitments of persons who do not satisfy the stan-
dard commitment criteria.371 For example, suppose Andy were diag-
nosed with antisocial personality disorder. According to the DSM, the
diagnostic criteria for antisocial personality disorder include the
following:
A. There is a pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of
others occurring since age 15 years, as indicated by three (or more) of the
following:
(1) failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors as
indicated by repeatedly performing acts that are grounds for arrest
(2) deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases, or conning
others for personal profit or pleasure
(3) impulsivity or failure to plan ahead
(4) irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by repeated physical
fights or assaults
(5) reckless disregard for the safety of self or others
(6) consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by repeated failure to sustain
consistent work behavior or honor financial obligations
(7) lack of remorse, as indicated by being indifferent to or rationalizing
having hurt, mistreated, or stolen from another[.]3 7 2
This diagnosis would not be sufficient to support Andy's civil commit-
ment under the Nebraska Mental Health Commitment Act, unless
there is additional evidence demonstrating that his antisocial person-
ality disorder "involves a severe or substantial impairment of [his]
thought processes, sensory input, mood balance, memory, or ability to
reason which substantially interferes with [his] ability to meet the or-
370. See supra notes 360-61 and accompanying text.
371. See supra section III.C.
372. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISOR-
DERS 649-50 (4th ed. 1994). Other diagnostic criteria include the following: "The
individual is at least age 18 years .... There is evidence of Conduct Disorder ...
with onset before age 15 years .... [And] [t]he occurrence of antisocial behavior is
not exclusively during the course of Schizophrenia or a Manic Episode." Id. at
650.
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dinary demands of living or interferes with the safety or well-being of
others."373 Under the Sex Offender Commitment Act, however, this
additional evidence would not be necessary. 37 4 Since convicted sex of-
fender commitments are allowed to proceed when the standard civil
commitment criteria are not satisfied, it is appropriate to question
whether there is a reasonable basis for imposing different criteria on
"sexually violent predators" or "dangerous sex offenders" than on
others who are subject to civil commitment. 3 75 In Hendricks and
Crane, the Supreme Court did not address this question.37 6 Instead of
identifying a reasonable basis for distinguishing between sex offend-
ers worthy of commitment and other individuals worthy of commit-
ment, the Court focused upon whether the convicted sex offender
commitment criteria served to distinguish sex offenders worthy of
commitment "from other dangerous persons who are perhaps more
properly dealt with exclusively through criminal proceedings."3 7 7
This is certainly a legitimate concern, and it leads to the second prob-
lem with the argument that Andy's commitment is justified by the
presence of a psychological impairment: What is the nature of a psy-
chological impairment that could justify Andy's commitment without
undermining the justification for his conviction?
In Hendricks, the Court held that to justify a convicted sex offender
commitment, there must be evidence of a psychological impairment
that "serve [s] to limit involuntary civil confinement to those who suf-
fer from a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous beyond
their control." 378 The Court refined the volitional impairment concept
in Crane, stating "that there must be proof of serious difficulty in con-
trolling behavior," and that this serious difficulty "must be sufficient
to distinguish the dangerous sexual offender whose serious mental ill-
ness, abnormality, or disorder subjects him to civil commitment from
the dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal
case."3 79 Despite these efforts to identify the nature of the sort of
mental impairment that justifies convicted sex offender commitments,
the Supreme Court's conceptualization of a volitional impairment, or
373. NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-907 (Cum. Supp. 2006).
374. See L.B. 1199, 99th Leg., 2d Sess. § 87(1), (4) (Neb. 2006). This is not to say that
antisocial personality disorder is sufficient to justify a dangerous sex offender
commitment. See id. § 87(1).
375. See supra notes 370-71 and accompanying text; see also Baxstrom v. Herold, 383
U.S. 107, 110-12 (1966) (finding that any person who has been civilly committed
at the end of a prison term must be given the same opportunity for judicial review
that all other civilly committed persons receive).
376. It should be noted that the Court may not have been presented with an equal
protection argument based upon Baxstrom in either Hendricks or Crane.
377. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412 (2002) (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521
U.S. 346, 360 (1997)).
378. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358.
379. Crane, 534 U.S. at 413 (citing Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357-58).
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"serious difficulty in controlling behavior," that distinguishes persons
appropriate for civil commitment from ordinary recidivists is difficult
to grasp. 38 0 Aside from the vagueness of the concept, which the Court
suggests is intentional,38l perhaps the greatest difficulty lies in the
fact that whatever the nature of a volitional impairment sufficient to
justify a dangerous sex offender commitment might be, such an im-
pairment must, in order to perform the justificatory function specified
by the Supreme Court, not only serve to distinguish dangerous sex
offenders from ordinary criminals, but it must not undermine their ca-
pacity for criminal responsibility. Since Hendricks provides an exam-
ple of a psychological impairment that, according to the Court, suffices
to justify a convicted sex offender commitment, the evidence in Hen-
dricks will be used to illustrate this problem.
The Court found that "Hendricks' diagnosis as a pedophile
plainly suffices for due process purposes," because his "admitted lack
of volitional control, coupled with a prediction of future dangerous-
ness, adequately distinguishes [him] from other dangerous persons
who are perhaps more properly dealt with exclusively through crimi-
nal proceedings."382 Hendricks' "admitted lack of volitional control"
stems from testimony that "he cannot 'control the urge' to molest chil-
dren" when he is "stressed out."38 3 He also testified "that the only
sure way he could keep from sexually abusing children in the future
was 'to die,"' even though "he hoped he would not sexually molest chil-
dren again."38 4 When this testimony is taken at face value-as the
Court appears to have taken it-one supposes that if Hendricks were
"stressed out" during his commitment hearing, he would have vaulted
the witness stand and attempted to molest any child witness who ap-
peared to testify against him, right before the eyes of the judge and
jury. It is easy to accept that this sort of volitional impairment would
amount to a "serious difficulty in controlling behavior" that would jus-
tify a civil commitment under the Court's rule. Note, however, that
Hendricks' diagnosis of pedophilia predated his latest criminal convic-
tion and sentence. 38 5 This means that an institutional determination
was made that Hendricks was accountable for his sex offenses despite
his volitional impairment. Yet if the volitional impairment is as se-
vere as his credited testimony suggests, his volitional impairment
would seem to undermine the finding that he was criminally responsi-
ble for his sex offenses. In other words, it is arguable that a person
who cannot control his unwanted urges to molest children, which stem
380. See Schopp, supra note 317, at 341-43.
381. See Crane, 534 U.S. at 413-14.
382. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 360.
383. Id.
384. Id. at 355.
385. See id. at 354-55.
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from a diagnosed psychological impairment, should be civilly commit-
ted-but he is not an appropriate subject of condemnation owing to
his serious volitional impairment. 38 6
Returning to Andy's case, it appears that the argument that his
commitment as a sex offender is civil in nature is not particularly per-
suasive unless it can be shown that he suffers from a psychological
impairment that not only makes him likely to commit sex offenses and
seriously affects his ability to control his behavior, but also manages
to avoid undermining his prior conviction by calling into doubt his ca-
pacity for criminal responsibility. On the other hand, one might argue
persuasively that Andy's commitment actually performs the expres-
sive function of punishment.
Note that the primary diagnostic criteria for antisocial personality
disorder are largely satisfied when a person simply engages in re-
peated violations of the criminal law. 38 7 Assume that this is true in
Andy's case. Thus, this diagnosis, standing alone, probably would not
serve to distinguish Andy from ordinary recidivists who ought to be
dealt with exclusively by the criminal justice system.3 88 As the Court
instructs, there must be some additional evidence that this disorder
consists "of a special and serious lack of ability to control behavior" to
distinguish Andy from the ordinary recidivist.3 89 Suppose that Andy
does not admit, as Hendricks did, that he cannot control himself and
will not stop committing sex offenses until he is killed.390 Therefore,
in order to prove that Andy has a serious difficulty in controlling his
behavior, the state submits evidence that Andy has a very long history
386. Indeed, a minority of jurisdictions apply the Model Penal Code's version of the
insanity defense, which contains a volitional prong: "A person is not responsible
for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or
defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality ... of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law." MODEL PENAL
CODE § 4.01(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (emphasis added). A volitional im-
pairment such as Hendricks' would likely result in a finding that he is not crimi-
nally responsible under this test. For a recently compiled list ofjurisdictions that
currently use the Model Penal Code's definition of insanity, see Amy D. Gund-
lach-Evans, Note, State v. Calin: The Paradox of the Insanity Defense and Guilty
but Mentally Ill Statute, Recognizing Impairment Without Affording Treatment,
51 S.D. L. REV. 122, 134 n.120 (2006). Washington, Kansas, and Nebraska are
not among these jurisdictions. See id.
387. See supra note 372 and accompanying text. All of the criteria for antisocial per-
sonality disorder would be established if the repeat offender commits violent acts,
such as rape, is eighteen years of age or older, has a history of symptoms of Con-
duct Disorder starting before age 15, and does not commit his offenses while suf-
fering schizophrenia or manic episodes. See supra note 372 and accompanying
text (specifically diagnostic criteria A(1), (4), and (5)).
388. Indeed, the Court seems to state as much. See Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407,
412 (2002) (citing P. Moran, The Epidemiology of Antisocial Personality Disorder,
34 Soc. PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHIATRIC EPIDEMIOLOGY 231, 234 (1999)).
389. Id. at 412-13.
390. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 355, 360.
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of committing sex offenses. One might argue that such evidence could
conceivably resolve the difficult problem summarized in the preceding
paragraph; specifically, evidence that Andy commits sex offenses at an
incredible rate would seem to support a finding that he has a psycho-
logical impairment (i.e., antisocial personality disorder) that seriously
affects his ability to control his behavior, and since the impairment is
based upon a "pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of
others,"39 1 it is difficult to argue that the impairment undermines his
capacity for criminal responsibility. However, this scenario is prob-
lematic for three reasons.
First, evidence that Andy is simply a recidivist probably will not
perform the discriminatory function specified by the Court in Crane,
because the state's proof of Andy's "serious difficulty in controlling be-
havior.., must be sufficient to distinguish [him] ... from the danger-
ous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case."3 9 2 If
the evidence submitted by the state suggests that Andy is a unique
"super recidivist," however, it is at least arguable that the State's evi-
dence will suffice.
Second, and more importantly, it appears that Andy's commitment
under these circumstances would violate his substantive due process
rights. To refresh, the Court has held that civil commitments are con-
sistent with substantive due process principles if they are based upon
evidence of a psychological impairment coupled with dangerousness;
dangerousness alone is not sufficient to justify a civil commitment. 39 3
In Andy's case, however, his psychological impairment is based upon
the fact that he is a repeat sex offender. His criminal history provides
the foundation for his diagnosis, the finding that he has a serious diffi-
culty controlling his behavior, and his dangerousness. Thus, it is diffi-
cult to argue that his commitment is not based solely on the
dangerousness demonstrated by his past criminal conduct.3 9 4
Third, and relatedly, to the extent that Andy's commitment is
founded upon a determination that he is a career criminal, the expres-
sive function performed by his commitment is unclear. Indeed, argua-
bly his commitment performs the expressive function of criminal
punishment. Since the commitment is based upon evidence of Andy's
past criminal behavior, it certainly seems as if it amounts to a depri-
vation of liberty based upon the commission of an institutionally pro-
scribed act by an accountable agent. In other words, there is an
391. Am. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, supra note 372, at 649-50.
392. Crane, 534 U.S. at 413 (citing Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357-58).
393. Id. at 409-10 (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357-58); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504
U.S. 71, 80 (1992).
394. The same is true in a case where a commitment is based upon a diagnosis of "rape
as paraphilia," which amounts simply to a recharacterization of criminal behav-
ior as a psychological impairment. See supra subsection II.B.l.b.
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expression of condemnation type one and, to the extent that the deter-
mination that Andy has a psychological impairment that seriously af-
fects his volitional control is truly nothing other than a determination
that Andy has committed a series of sex offenses as an accountable
agent, the determination expresses condemnation type four. It follows
then that his commitment is punitive, and that it may be said to per-
form retributive and deterrent functions.
In sum, the expressive function of sexual predator commitments is
difficult to discern. On the one hand, if a person with prior convictions
for sex offenses can be shown to have a psychological impairment that
truly renders him substantially unable to control his criminal conduct,
his commitment under a sex offender commitment statute seems to
serve the functions that are traditionally performed by the institution
of civil commitment. That is, the commitment would amount to an
exercise of the state's police power to provide treatment for a serious
psychological impairment while protecting the public from danger,
and it would be difficult to argue that the commitment actually per-
forms the expressive function of punishment. However, it would also
be difficult to understand how the findings of criminal accountability
that accompanied the person's sex offense convictions could stand in
the wake of a determination that those offenses were committed by a
person who was suffering from a psychological disorder that seriously
impaired his volitional control. At minimum, the expressive function
of those convictions would seem to be diluted. On the other hand, if
the psychological impairment that justifies the commitment is based
upon diagnostic criteria that are satisfied when a person simply com-
mits a sex offense or series of sex offenses, 3 95 the commitment would
not call into doubt the person's criminal responsibility for his prior
offenses, but it would raise questions about the expressive function of
the commitment. Arguably, the commitment would express condem-
nation toward the person because it is based essentially upon a deter-
mination that the person committed an institutionally proscribed act
(or a series of such acts) as a criminally responsible actor. Under
these circumstances, the commitment would be punitive, and it could
legitimately serve the goals of retribution and deterrence that are or-
dinarily served by criminal punishment. The commitments would
also be subject to double jeopardy and, perhaps, ex post facto
challenges.
395. The Washington, Kansas, and Nebraska statutes' provisions indicating that per-
sonality disorders can sustain convicted sex offender commitments allow for this
possibility, and if the cases discussed throughout this Article are representative
of the types of impairments that are used to justify these commitments, it seems
the commitments are regularly based upon impairments that are essentially
"crime diagnoses." See, e.g., Crane, 534 U.S. at 411 (exhibitionism and antisocial
personality disorder); Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 355 (pedophilia); In re Young, 857
P.2d 989, 1002 (Wash. 1993) ("rape as paraphilia").
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This quandary, which stems from the ambiguous nature of a psy-
chological impairment that could justify convicted sex offender com-
mitments without undermining criminal accountability, not only
makes it difficult to identify the civil or criminal nature of these com-
mitments, but also results in a blurring of the division of functions
between the institutions of criminal justice and civil commitment. Or-
dinarily, it is clear that the criminal justice system is the conventional
institution for imposing punishment upon criminally responsible ac-
tors, and therefore its dispositions typically perform an expressive
function and serve the goals of retribution and deterrence. It is also
ordinarily clear that, in contrast, civil commitment is the conventional
mechanism for treating the psychologically impaired while protecting
the public from danger. Convicted sex offender commitments purport
to perform the functions of civil commitment, but, as explained above,
they may perform the expressive, retributive, and deterrent functions
of punishment. Disturbingly, there are indications that the public's
understanding of the ordinary functions of the institutions of punish-
ment and civil commitment is affected by the distortion caused by con-
victed sex offender commitments. Although the public may prefer
that sex offenders be punished rather than treated,3 96 there is evi-
dence that citizens-and even the bar-have come to believe that the
criminal law is not serving its proper functions, and that they must
turn to convicted sex offender commitments to see those functions per-
formed. Consider the implications of the following summary of the
testimony given during Crane's sexual predator commitment hearing:
At the commitment trial, the victim expressed her disappointment in the
course Crane's prosecution had taken. The prosecutor drew out her dissatis-
faction by asking, "So would it be fair to say that for a crime that this Court
gave a 35-to-life sentence to Mr. Crane, he only served a little over four
years?" And he followed up on her affirmative response with "[a]nd under-
standably you're very upset about how the system treated you in this case,
right?" "Yes, very," she answered. The victim had been told by the State that
the kidnapping charge could not be refiled against Crane on account of a
technicality.
In this regard, the prosecutor had suggested to her that obtaining a guilty
plea "was the best way to go in order to be able to go down the line" and use
the option of the [Sexual Predator] Act. The victim agreed to the plea bargain
because she believed "it was the only way to make sure that it didn't end
there." The victim testified, "I was not aware that there was an option of go-
ing to trial and going through this or agreeing to the plea and then using the
396. This is illustrated by the comments made by Helen Harlow, the mother of the boy
who was assaulted by Earl Shriner in Washington, upon her tour of the "ultra-
secure Civil Commitment Center" designed to house persons committed under
the sexually violent predator law: "I tried to envision Earl Shriner here and de-
cided no, I'd rather have him behind bars .... I don't think he deserves this
opportunity. It's nicer than prison." Debera Carlton Harrell, A Place for Poten-
tial Predators: Ultra-Secure Center Stems from New Law, SEATTLE POST-INTELLI-
GENCER, June 29, 1990, at B2, available at 1990 WLNR 1286846.
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Sexual Predator Act. As I was-as I understood, this was the only option, but
if we can get a-some kind of a conviction, then we can use this option later
down the road to make sure he stays off the street."3 9 7
Indeed, the Washington task force that generated the original sexual
predator commitment procedure viewed its mission as "respond[ing]
in a meaningful and responsible way to the public outrage over ...
cases in which violent sex offenders were released to the community
only to reoffend." 398 One might reasonably conclude that convicted
sex offender commitments were born out of frustration with the per-
ceived inadequacies of the criminal justice system and, to some extent,
the institution of civil commitment, and that the true expressive func-
tion of this new "civil" institution is not to express condemnation to-
ward the offenders as much as frustration and outrage toward the
traditional institutions' handling of sex offenders.
V. CONCLUSION
Historically, states have treated sex offenders as either criminals
or psychological deviants depending on whether the prevailing philos-
ophy of the era emphasized punitive or rehabilitative goals. This sug-
gests that there exists an inherent flexibility, or ambiguity, in the way
that social institutions might respond to sex offenders. That is, due to
the nature of their offenses, it seems appropriate to treat sex offenders
either as accountable criminals or as deviants driven by abnormal
psychological urges. In the aftermath of heinous sex offenses commit-
ted in the State of Washington, a task force devised a new commit-
ment procedure that could be used to secure the civil commitments of
convicted sex offenders who were nearing the end of their prison
sentences, but who did not suffer from a psychological impairment or
manifest dangerousness that would satisfy the state's traditional civil
commitment statute. This new procedure represented a marked de-
parture from previous sex offender commitment laws, which generally
established alternatives-rather than successors-to criminal
proceedings.
Challenges to the controversial commitments authorized under the
Washington statute and a similar statute adopted in Kansas have
been raised, and courts have reached different conclusions about the
civil nature of these commitments and their compatibility with princi-
ples of substantive due process. The United States Supreme Court
ultimately resolved each of these issues in favor of the constitutional-
ity of the commitments. To resolve the first issue, the Court applied
the deferential Ward test and determined that the convicted sex of-
fender commitments were indeed civil. In so doing, the Court noted
397. In re Crane, 7 P.3d 285, 287 (Kan. 2000).
398. Maleng, supra note 35, at 821.
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that there was no clear proof that the commitments performed the
functions traditionally reserved for punishment-retribution and de-
terrence-so as to negate the legislature's intention to create a civil
statute. The Court resolved the second issue by determining that the
psychological impairments used to justify the commitments satisfied
substantive due process concerns to the extent that the impairments
limit commitments to persons who suffer from volitional impairments
that cause "serious difficulty in controlling behavior."
In 2006, Nebraska adopted the Sex Offender Commitment Act,
which, like the Washington and Kansas sex offender commitment
laws, allows for the civil commitment of convicted sex offenders who
do not satisfy the traditional commitment criteria of mental illness
and dangerousness. Thus, the Nebraska statute also raises difficult
questions about the "civil" nature of these commitments and the na-
ture of the psychological impairments that might justify them. One
might argue that the Supreme Court's decisions concerning the consti-
tutionality of the Washington and Kansas statutes apply with equal
force to Nebraska's Sex Offender Commitment Act. However, this Ar-
ticle presents and applies an alternate analytical framework that
might be used to examine the difficult questions raised by the con-
victed sex offender commitment statutes in all three states. This
framework is based upon the defining expressive function of punish-
ment, or condemnation. Arguably, when condemnation is separated
into distinct levels of analysis, a framework emerges that helps distin-
guish criminal punishment from ordinary civil commitments. The key
distinguishing factor under this framework is the expression of con-
demnation that is directed towards a person when there has been an
institutional determination that he was criminally responsible for
committing a proscribed act. Criminal sentences express this condem-
nation, and are therefore punitive, because they are based upon deter-
minations that the defendant was accountable for committing a
proscribed act. Civil commitments do not express this condemnation,
even when they are imposed in connection with criminal proceedings,
because they are not based upon such a determination.
When this framework-and its focus on criminal responsibility-is
applied to convicted sex offender commitments, the justificatory
problems that inhere in these commitments become salient. Specifi-
cally, the framework reveals that the Supreme Court failed to define
sufficiently the sort of impairment that could support a finding that
the sex offender suffers from a serious difficulty in controlling his be-
havior that justifies his commitment but does not undermine the de-
termination that he was criminally responsible for his offenses. Since
the type of impairment that could perform this function remains am-
biguous, it is difficult to determine with certainty whether convicted
sex offender commitments are punitive. However, it is arguable that
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they do in fact perform the expressive, retributive, and deterrent func-
tions of punishment. At the very least, the mysterious nature of the
expressive function of convicted sex offender commitments indicates
that the institutions of punishment and civil commitment-and the
separate functions that they are meant to perform-have been blurred
and distorted in order to ensure that the incapacitation of criminals
may continue through civil commitments.
